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ABSTRACT 
Climate change in the Arctic is affecting the ice melt more rapidly than previously 
anticipated and the Arctic is now forecast to be ice-free by 2013.  International 
borders, fossil fuel reservoirs and new sea routes for navigation are just a few of 
the issues at stake due to the receding ice cover. Contrary to those who perceive 
U.S.-Russian conflict arising out of the region and advocate a military response, 
this thesis argues that the Arctic, precisely because of its rich hydrocarbon 
resources, may prove to be amenable to a capitalist peace. Research suggests 
that nations linked by economic interdependence are less apt to engage in 
conflict with each other. Nations seeking foreign direct investment will be less 
likely to initiate conflict, as this would diminish the potential for attracting foreign 
capital.  Russia’s economy is dependent on oil and natural gas exports and these 
industries have created enormous wealth for the nation.  Yet Russia’s existing 
fossil fuel reservoirs are nearing exhaustion. Tapping into Arctic reserves is a 
strategic imperative for Russia; however, it lacks the technological capacity to do 
so.  The energy industry in the West is farther along in developing such 
extractive technology.  This thesis argues that Russia’s need of foreign 
assistance in its hydrocarbon sector will make Russia more pacific, thereby 
offsetting realist fears of a military conflict in the Arctic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Climate change in the Arctic is affecting the ice melt more rapidly than 
previously anticipated.  Where earlier models predicted an ice-free Arctic in 2150, 
new models forecast the Arctic to be ice-free by 2013.1  As Figure 1 
demonstrates, international borders, fossil fuel reservoirs and new sea routes for 
navigation are just a few of the issues being debated as a result of the receding 
ice cover.  
 Numerous sources refer to heightened tensions between Russia and the 
other Arctic states, resulting from competition over newly uncovered resources 
and waterways.2   The situation in the Arctic has evolved to one reminiscent of 
the Cold War where Russian “long-range bombers, supported by tankers, escort 
fighters and reconnaissance aircraft” patrol the airspace for the first time since 
the Cold War ended. 3  Additionally, the Russian Navy has resumed patrols in the 
Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union.   
                                            
1 United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Climate Change 
and the Arctic: New Frontiers of National Security,” at: 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/48332.pdf (accessed April 15, 2010), 10; Ronald O'Rourke, 
“Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, March 
2010, 7.  
2 For example, see Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability,” Survival 51, no. 
5 (October 2009), 121–142; Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut. “U.S. Strategic Interests in the 
Arctic,” at: http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf 
(accessed May 1, 2010); O’Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for 
Congress.” 
3 Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability,” 126. 
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Figure 1.   Ongoing disputes in the Arctic4 
                                            
4 Roderick Kefferputz, “On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North,” 
CEPS Policy Brief, no. 205 (2010). 
 3
If tensions were to escalate, the U.S. Navy is unprepared to exhibit a show 
of force, as it is unable to safely operate on the surface in the region.  
Construction of a naval Arctic arm will be costly, time consuming, and, 
considering the Defense Department’s 2010 directive aimed at reducing 
spending, unlikely.5  Yet as Russia’s military presence in the region continues to 
grow and if the nation succeeds in gaining the territory it claims it rightfully owns, 
Russian forces will encroach on historically isolated U.S. interests in the area.6   
Numerous sources refer to heightened tensions between Russia and the 
other Arctic states, resulting from competition over newly uncovered resources 
and waterways.7   The situation in the Arctic has evolved to one reminiscent of 
the Cold War where Russian “long-range bombers, supported by tankers, escort 
fighters and reconnaissance aircraft” patrol the airspace for the first time since 
the Cold War ended. 8  Additionally, the Russian Navy has resumed patrols in the 
Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union.   
If tensions were to escalate, the U.S. Navy is unprepared to exhibit a show 
of force, as it is unable to safely operate on the surface in the region.  
Construction of a naval Arctic arm will be costly, time consuming, and, 
considering the Defense Department’s 2010 directive aimed at reducing 
spending, unlikely.9  Yet as Russia’s military presence in the region continues to 
                                            
5 CNN Wire Staff, “Gates: Pentagon Must Cut Overhead, Restrain Spending,” at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/09/gates.defense/index.html?hpt=T2 (accessed May 9, 
2010).  In May 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered the Defense Department’s 
leadership to reduce spending by 2 to 3 percent, an amount equal to more than $10 billion. 
6 Roger Howard, Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources (New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 176.  These interests include a portion of the U.S. energy infrastructure 
as well as vital radar and communications links used by the U.S. military.  
7 For example, see Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability,” Survival 51, no. 
5 (October 2009), 121–142; Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut. “U.S. Strategic Interests in the 
Arctic,” at: http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf 
(accessed May 1, 2010); O’Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for 
Congress.” 
8 Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability,” 126. 
9 CNN Wire Staff, “Gates: Pentagon Must Cut Overhead, Restrain Spending,” at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/09/gates.defense/index.html?hpt=T2 (accessed May 9, 
2010).  In May 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered the Defense Department’s 
leadership to reduce spending by 2 to 3 percent, an amount equal to more than $10 billion. 
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grow and if the nation succeeds in gaining the territory it claims it rightfully owns, 
Russian forces will encroach on historically isolated U.S. interests in the area.10   
With the Alaskan coastline only 57 miles across the Bering Strait from 
Russian territory, adherents to the realist theory of international relations may 
interpret the presence of a newly robust Russian navy and an increasingly active 
air force as upsetting the balance of power in the region.  Considering the 
importance both nations have placed on their Arctic interests, realists might 
further expect conflict to arise out of the situation and would seek to bolster the 
nation’s military power to counter anticipated foreign aggression.   However, 
another possibility exists for how U.S.-Russian relations can evolve, a possibility 
based on the promise of a capitalist peace.11  The purpose of this work is to 
examine the potential for establishing a capitalist peace as a means of easing 
tensions among the United States, its allies, and Russia in an effort to encourage 
peaceful conflict resolution and prevent a dramatic increase in Arctic hostilities.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
Currently, the United States does not possess any ice-hardened warships 
and its only three icebreakers are approaching the end of their 30-year service 
lives.12  Additionally, the icebreaker mission was transferred to the Coast Guard 
in 1966 and is split between Coast Guard operations, scientific and logistics-
                                            
10 Roger Howard, Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources (New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 176.  These interests include a portion of the U.S. energy infrastructure 
as well as vital radar and communications links used by the U.S. military.  
11 Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 
(January 2007), 166.  According to Gartzke, “Economic development, free markets, and similar 
interstate interests all anticipate a lessening of militarized disputes or wars. This ‘capitalist peace’ 
also accounts for the effect commonly attributed to regime type [i.e. democratic peace theory] in 
standard statistical tests of the democratic peace.” The capitalist peace will be explained in much 
greater detail later in Chapter I. 
12 Ronald O'Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” 7. Ice-
free does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent” or “area” 
varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure of the amount of ice and is equal 
to the sum of the area of grid cells that have less than a set percentage—frequently 15%—ice 
concentration.  For this reason, ice-strengthened ships or icebreaker-escorted convoys are 
necessary. 
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oriented tasks.  These three Coast Guard vessels, coupled with the icebreaker 
Nathaniel B. Palmer (owned by the National Science Foundation and used solely 
for scientific missions), “constitute the entire fleet of U.S. ships equipped for polar 
operations.”13  Contrast this situation with that of Russia, which possesses 18 
icebreakers, 10 of which are nuclear powered.14  Allocating funds to reinforce 
current naval vessels for Arctic missions or constructing new icebreakers during 
an economic downturn could be problematic.  Nonetheless, National Security 
Presidential Directive-66 (NSPD-66), released in January 2009, calls for the 
development of “greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect 
United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region” as well as projecting 
“a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential 
United States interests.”15  These interests, the directive further notes, are 
“missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for 
strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security 
operation; and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight.”16  Fulfilling the 
president’s goal via military expansion will be costly and time-consuming.17  
Although the need for increased law enforcement and search-and-rescue 
capabilities are not in dispute for a region soon to experience increased human 
traffic, it is necessary to scrutinize the need to maintain a robust military 
presence.  The time requirement for polar-capable ship construction is 10 years 
                                            
13 David Gove, “Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier,” Proceedings 135, no. 2 (February 
2009).  
14 National Research Council of the National Academies, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing 
World (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2007), 59. 
15 George W. Bush, “NSPD-66/HSPD-25,” at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-
66.htm (accessed April 18, 2010). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ronald O'Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS 
Report for Congress, October 2010, 5.  According to Congressional Research Service 
communication with a State Department Official on October 8, 2010, the Obama Administration 
has not issued a new directive that would supersede NSPD-66 and is currently operating under 
the Bush Administration’s directive.   
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and each ship may cost as much as $1 billion.18   It is important that U.S. 
policymakers understand the validity of the threats posed to U.S. interests and 
what means are available, other than a military show of force, to effectively 
neutralize these threats.      
C. ANALYSIS OF COMPETING THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis will compare two theories that may influence the future of 
international politics in the Arctic.  This section begins with an analysis of realism, 
whose adherents likely envision a future characterized by conflict in the Arctic.  A 
discussion focusing on the capitalist peace follows realism.  The work’s 
hypothesis ends this section. 
1. Realism 
The field of international relations is composed of contending theories, or 
theoretical perspectives, that seek to explain relationships among countries, 
governments, people and organizations.  Political realism, more commonly 
referred to as realism, is one particular family of international relations theories 
that emphasizes the more “competitive and conflictual” aspect of world politics.19  
Realists consider the main actors in international politics to be the states, which 
are primarily concerned with their own security.  As such, states act in pursuit of 
their own self-interests and work to amass power to ensure their security is not 
threatened.  Whereas national politics adheres to the concept of authority and 
law, realists perceive international politics as a “sphere without justice, 
characterized by active or potential conflict among states.”20   
                                            
18 Amy McCullough, “Stronger Hulls Could Help Fill Icebreaker Gap,” Navy Times, February 
22, 2009, at: http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/02/coastguard_arctic_022209/ (accessed 
April 19, 2010). 
19 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, "Political Realism in International Relations," at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ (accessed November 1, 2010). 
20 Ibid. 
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The differing aspect of each of the theories classified under realism is their 
underlying justification for the quest for power or security.21  Hans Morgenthau’s 
classical realism attributes the desire for power to human nature.  According to 
Morgenthau, every human being is born with the need to possess power relative 
to his or her peers.  Since human beings lead nations, this desire for power is 
transferred to international politics.22  In structural realism (also known as 
neorealism), the principal actors are the states and not the individuals leading 
them.  Thus, for structural realists, regime type and cultural differences are 
irrelevant.  Structural realists attribute the anarchic structure of the international 
system to states’ pursuit of power and security.  With no higher authority 
overseeing state interaction, states must accumulate as much power as possible 
to both serve as a deterrent from potential attack as well as to protect themselves 
if attacked.23    
Realists such as John J. Mearsheimer argue that “factors of military power 
have been most important in shaping past events, and will remain central in the 
future.”24  Mearsheimer further contends that realists view the international 
system as a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage 
of each other…International relations is not a constant state of war, but a state of 
relentless security competition.”25  With Russia’s proposed increase in 
capabilities as well as its recent military maneuvers in the North (both of which 
will be examined in Chapter II), realists would likely conclude that Russia is 
positioning itself to tip the regional balance of power in its favor. 
                                            
21 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics." International 
Organization, 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 39-75.  Power, when used in conjunction with international 
relations, is defined as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the 
capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.”   
22 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4–15. 
23 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories, Discipline and 
Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 72.       
24 John J. Mearscheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), 7. 
25 John J. Mearscheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), 10. 
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 Perceiving Russia’s efforts as a power grab, a likely realist response from 
the other Arctic states would be to increase their own Arctic military capabilities.  
The proposals outlined above in NSPD-66 as well as its follow-on publication, the 
U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, appear to mirror realist thinking as both propose 
augmenting the current force with more Arctic-capable vessels.  The same is true 
for Canada and Norway where officials have adopted similar policies.26  
However, military augmentation may not be necessary if a capitalist peace is 
established in the contentious Arctic region. 
2. The Capitalist Peace  
“The Capitalist Peace,” published by Erik Gartzke in 2007, did not 
introduce a new concept.  Gartzke merely refined the theory and sought to prove 
it true through statistical analysis.  The idea that capitalism binds potential rivals 
and wards off subsequent conflict is an ancient one with some references dating 
back almost two millennia. 
In 100 AD, for example, the Roman philosopher Plutarch, in speaking of 
the trade made possible by traversing the sea, declared, “This element [the sea], 




                                            
26 One week after Russia planted a titanium national flag on the Arctic seabed, Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced an increase the Canadian Forces’ military capabilities.  
His proposal included the opening of a new army training center for cold-weather fighting at 
Resolute Bay, a deep-water port at Nanisivik, on the northern tip of Baffin Island, an increase its 
military presence in the far north with 900 additional Canadian Rangers and the construction of 
six to eight new navy patrol ships.  See Associated Press, “Canada-Russia Arctic Tensions Rise,” 
at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/03/17/arctic-russia017.html (accessed April 20, 2010).  In 
August 2009, Norway relocated its military command base from Stavanger to Bodø, a base 
previously occupied for Cold War operations located inside the Arctic Circle.  See BBC News, 
“Inside Norway's underground military HQ,” at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
11386699 (accessed October 2, 2010).  Additionally, Norway has ordered a new intelligence 
vessel destined for Arctic operations whose “main task is to keep track of the Russian armed 
forces’ activities.”  See Barents Observer, “Norway Orders New Spy Ship for the High North,” at: 
http://www.barentsobserver.com/norway-orders-new-spy-ship-for-the-high-north.4835659-
116320.html (accessed November 1, 2010). 
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complete, redressing defects by mutual assistance and exchange and so 
bringing about cooperation and friendship.”27  Montesquieu, in 1748, went on to 
say: 
Peace is the natural effect of trade.  Two nations who traffic with 
each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an 
interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their 
union is founded on their mutual necessities.28   
A final example is given by Norman Angell, the 1933 winner of the Nobel 
Peace Prize, who asserted that economic connections made it “impossible for 
one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another…war, even when 
victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.”29     
It was not until Gartzke began investigating capitalism’s effect on conflict 
avoidance and comparing the findings with other theories (such as the 
democratic peace theory) that the stability offered by economic ties became 
more noticeable.  Whereas the aforementioned theorists focused more on the 
unprofitable nature of military conquest and the futility of conducting such 
operations, Gartzke revealed how economic ties actually prevented conflict from 
escalating. 
Gartzke observed how the peace-through-economics theories mentioned 
above as well as those of more contemporary political economists were met with 
resistance as, “two world wars and associated economic upheaval reversed the 
trend toward globalization and dissolved optimism about a capitalist peace.”30  
Following the Cold War, international relations scholars did migrate away from 
realist-centric thinking and began to consider the possibility of more liberal 
                                            
27 Douglas Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 11. 
28 Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner, The Founder's Constitution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 99. 
29 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: Putnam, 1933), 60. 
30 Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” 170. 
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approaches to state relations.  However, the liberal resurgence was more 
focused on democratic peace theory than on the effects of capitalism.31   
According to Gartzke, the initial capitalist peace theorists adhered too 
closely to the idea that resource competition was the only catalyst for war.  In 
effect, these scholars trusted that once states realized the unprofitable nature of 
wars of conquest they would abandon such notions and forge more diplomatic 
bonds.  Gartzke’s refinement of the capitalist peace theory included the 
acknowledgement that “if there are other reasons why nations fight [besides 
resource competition], then some wars will occur, despite the basic validity of 
capitalist peace arguments.”32  Therefore, capitalism will not eliminate war 
altogether but may decrease the possibility that that such a war will occur.  This 
is due to capitalism altering the way states calculate their interests with respect to 
cooperation and conflict with the former becoming more prominent when two 
countries are interdependent.   
Based on his analysis: 
Capitalism resolves insecurity by creating “powerful pacifists,” 
countries possessing military strength ensuring that they are largely 
free from foreign influence or domination, but equally that they lack 
incentives to act aggressively abroad, at least under certain 
circumstances.33 
Gartzke goes on to say that, “states with similar interests, or integrated 
markets, or mutual development and an absence of policy differences are less 
likely to fight.”34 With this in mind, if economic interdependence can be 
established between Russia and its Arctic neighbors then the tension resulting 
                                            
31 Fred Chernoff, "Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory," 
European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009); Michael Mousseau and Shi Yuhang, 
"A Test for Reverse Causality in the Democratic Peace Relationship," Journal of Peace Research 
36, no. 6 (1999); Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993); Michael W. 
Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 
(Summer 1983). 
32 Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” 170. 
33 Ibid., 171. 
34 Ibid., 178. 
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from the realist-perceived power imbalance may be reduced.  In doing so, the 
proposals calling for a dramatic increase in Arctic military capabilities may be 
reduced or rejected altogether.   
Equally compelling is the evidence offered by author Stephen G. Brooks in 
his book, Producing Security.  Brooks argues that the worldwide migration away 
from unilateral development and production practices has eased the tensions 
between historic adversaries.  He notes how the “global production shift can, 
under certain conditions, enhance the prospects for peace by contributing to the 
consolidation of deep regional economic integration among long-standing 
security rivals.”35  More important, as it relates to this thesis, is Brooks’ finding 
that aggressive policies run counter to economic stability because they diminish 
the potential for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).36  Were Russia to initiate a 
conflict it would likely harm any prospect the state may have for outside 
assistance in its need for hydrocarbon production.37   
Other scholars further substantiate Brooks’ conclusion regarding conflict 
negatively influencing the potential for FDI.  These scholars also reinforce 
Gartzke’s conclusion that capitalism, in this case corporate leadership pursuing 
FDI, serves as an effective deterrent to military conflict.  A paper presented by 
Margit Bussmann and Hans Wild at the 2010 International Studies Association 
(ISA) convention revealed how “foreign investment can restrain countries from 
getting involved in conflict.”38  With this, if Western corporations were to heavily 
invest in Russian industry, Russia may be more reluctant to initiate a military 
dispute.  Further, Bussmann and Wild examined whether the onset of a conflict 
                                            
35 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 7. 
36 Ibid., 10. 
37 Chapter III of this thesis discusses Russia’s need for assistance in its hydrocarbon 
industry. 
38 Margit Bussmann and Hans Wild, "Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized Conflict," 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre 
Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004), 1. 
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reduced the inflow FDI and concluded that FDI was in fact reduced between 
dyads with the onset of a fatal conflict.39  This is significant to this thesis because 
if FDI could be established between the United States and Russia, Russia would 
be loathe lose it.  The desire to retain this investment may reduce the possibility 
of Russia of initiating a military conflict with the United States.  Hoon Lee and 
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell’s research, presented at a follow-on ISA convention, 
mirror Bussmann and Wild’s findings.  Their analysis revealed how: 
Bilateral FDI inflows between two disputants significantly reduce 
the chances for escalation to high levels of violence over contested 
issues and improve the chances for peaceful conflict 
management…additional analysis also finds that strong support for 
the opportunity costs as a primary mechanism linking FDI and 
conflict management.40 
Lee’s earlier research addressed levels of FDI and showed how “the more 
FDI host countries receive, the less likely they are to initiate militarized interstate 
conflicts.”41 As will be explained below, Russia is in need of substantial FDI in its 
hydrocarbon sector.  According to Lee’s analysis, the increase in FDI may serve 
to make Russia more pacific and nullify the power disparity in the North that is of 
great concern to realists. 
Bussmann, in an April 2010 article, also found “that inflows and stock of 
foreign investment reduce the risk of an outbreak of a fatal dispute.”42 More 
specifically, Bussmann found that “militarized conflicts inhibit foreign investment” 
not only within the warring parties but also from states external to the conflict 
                                            
39 Ibid., 2 and 13.  A fatal conflict is defined as a militarized interstate dispute with at least 
one battlefield death. 
40 Hoon Lee and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Foreign Direct Investment and Territorial 
Disputes," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New 
Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Feb 17, 2010), 
1. 
41 Hoon Lee, “Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized Interstate Conflict,” at: http://isa-
m.missouri.edu/Awards/Lee.pdf (accessed September 12, 2010), 1. 
42 Margit Bussmann, "Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized International Conflict," 
Journal of Peace Research, 47, no. 2 (April 2010), 143. 
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whose industry executives are wary of the instability that accompanies war.43  
Thus, Bussmann’s research further endorses the potential for FDI to limit the 
prospect of conflict in the Arctic.   
Polachek, Seiglie and Xiang’s research expands the notion that FDI can 
have a pacifying effect.  The authors note how direct investment has 
characteristics that trade lacks, most notably in the long term.  With trade, one 
state can substitute partners more frequently when conflict arises and all parties 
can work to minimize loss resulting from the termination of trade.  However, with 
FDI, investments cannot be withdrawn so easily and if they are withdrawn, the 
cost may never be recovered.  Polachek et al. explored the possibility that the 
investment parties may use their influence to push their respective governments 
to adopt policies that are more conciliatory if tension arises.  Additionally, the 
host government “may be induced to adopt cooperative policies in order to 
demonstrate a friendly image towards FDI in order to attract further investments 
from other countries.”44   
To test their theory, Polachek et al. utilized FDI data merged with data 
contained in Virtual Research Associates and Correlates of War 2.  Their intent 
was to statistically test if FDI flows impact the prospect of conflict and 
cooperation between nations.  Their statistical analysis found that as the amount 
of FDI increases, the potential for conflict decreases.45 
A final example of FDI limiting conflict escalation is illustrated in Ceren 
Altincekic’s October 2009 working paper.  Altincekic sought to clarify what aspect 
of Gartzke’s capitalist peace is most effective in nurturing peace.  “By controlling 
                                            
43 Bussmann, "Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized International Conflict," 143, 145. 
44 Solomon Polachek, Carlos Seiglie, and Jun Xiang, "Globalization and International 
Conflict: Can FDI Increase Peace?" in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference 
on Economics and Security, ed. Eftychia Nikolaidou (Thessaloniki: South East European 
Research Centre, 2006), 282. 
45 Polachek, Seiglie and Xiang, "Globalization and International Conflict: Can FDI Increase 
Peace?” 280. 
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for FDI, capital openness, trade, portfolio investment and equity investments 
simultaneously,” the report found that “capital openness and FDI, not trade or 
portfolio investment, [made] dyads significantly more peaceful.”46     
In sum, interstate relationships based on economic bonds have proven to 
be effective deterrents to fatal conflict initiation.  The strongest deterrent force 
occurs between dyads that experience high levels of FDI with one another.  Still 
significant, however, is how the desire to attract FDI prevents potentially 
aggressive states from initiating conflict even outside of the FDI-sending and 
receiving relationship.  The destabilizing effect of war makes investment risky, 
thereby causing states not directly involved in the conflict to be reluctant to invest 
in such an environment.  Russia’s stock market, for example, dropped to its 
lowest level in two years as a result of Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia.47  If 
significant FDI is established between Russia and the United States, the potential 
for the nations to engage in a military dispute may be reduced.  If such 
investment cannot be established, Russia may still be reluctant to initiate conflict 
with the United States because doing so might deter other states from investing 
in Russia’s industry.   
3. Hypothesis   
Russia is in position to gain access to much-needed energy resources 
resulting from the ice melt but is unable to tap into them due to a lack of 
advanced technology, technology that Western corporations are farther along in 
developing.  An avenue for mutual development may open with FDI and an 
increase in the number of multinational corporations.  However, this development 
will only occur if Russian leadership relaxes robust national barriers to such 
investment.  For example, an April 2008 Russian law considers hydrocarbons a 
                                            
46 Ceren Altincekic, “FDI Peace: Which "Capitalism" Leads to More Peace Among Dyads?” 
(Working paper, One Earth Future Foundation, 2009), 2. 
47 Andrew E. Kramer, "Georgian Conflict takes toll on Russian Stock Market," The New York 
Times, August 27, 2008, at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/business/worldbusiness/27iht-
ruble.4.15690754.html?_r=1 (accessed December 10, 2010). 
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strategic asset.  As a result, foreign investors must gain approval from the 
Russian government prior to acquiring more than a fifty percent stake in a 
strategic company.  Additionally, investors wishing to acquire more than ten 
percent of a Russian company “engaged in using mineral resources of federal 
significance” must acquire advance approval from the authorities.48  In reducing 
national controls, Russia would not only gain access to the energy it needs to 
remain economically viable, but international corporations would reap financial 
rewards as well.  This symbiotic relationship may foster a more peaceful 
coexistence in the contentious Arctic region by stemming any potential for conflict 
escalation. 
With the United States emerging from a recession, there is little chance 
that that the military buildup outlined in NSPD-66 and the Navy Arctic Roadmap 
will come to fruition.  Businesses in the United States stand to gain from 
investment overseas, yet Russia has traditionally made such investment difficult 
and unpredictable.49  A key issue with Arctic oil and natural gas exploration is 
that Russian industry technology lags at least 10 years behind its Western 
counterparts.50  Because of this lag, Russia has in the past allowed Western 
corporations to share in its energy resources in exchange for technological 
assistance only to mistreat the investors later on and force them out.  As will be 
explained in Chapter III, Russia’s energy resources are dwindling so it is 
essential that the state bring new production locations on line as soon as 
possible.  Because of this need, the Russian leadership may consider reducing 
the barriers to investment and accept that the nation will reap fewer rewards as 
Western corporations share their technology.   
                                            
48 Arild Moe and Elana Wilson Rowe, “Northern Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Policy 
Challenges and Approaches,” in Russia and the North, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2009), 109. 
49 Cindy Hurst, “Investment Risky in Russia as Politics Affects Profits,” Oil and Gas Journal, 
105, no. 27 (July 2007): 18–23.  
50 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 211. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential for establishing a 
capitalist peace between Russia and its Arctic neighbors against the backdrop of 
Russia’s declining hydrocarbon extraction capabilities.  The work’s hypothesis is 
that there is little potential for conflict in the Arctic due to Russia’s inability to 
harvest the newly uncovered hydrocarbons on its own. With Western 
corporations possessing the necessary technology, Russian aggression in the 
North would likely block the inflow of FDI and harm the state’s long-term 
economic viability.  If economic interconnectedness is established, the resultant 
capitalist peace would likely ease tensions in the region and the United States 
may not be forced to increase significantly its military presence in the North, 
thereby allaying realist concerns regarding the imbalance of Arctic military power.  
Intentional or accidental encroachment by the enlarged Russian military into 
sensitive U.S. areas would be less likely to escalate beyond diplomatic 
exchanges with the nations linked by economic bonds.  Without the ability to 
counter the Russian military directly should tensions escalate, relying on 
globalized production platforms—what Brooks argues is a “reserve stabilizer”—
may offer an alternative means of maintaining the security of the United States’ 
northernmost border.51 
This thesis cannot prove whether this hypothesis is correct, as such proof 
relies on Russia’s future behavior. It can explain, however, why the hypothesis is 
plausible, given its analysis of Russia’s hydrocarbon and technological 
resources. Contrary to realist predictions, therefore, this thesis seeks to establish 
the feasibility of a capitalist peace in the Arctic. 
                                            
51 Brooks,  Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing 
Calculus of Conflict, 216.  Brooks argues that “even if a risk-acceptant or blundering leader of a 
great power” does not heed other restraints such as the democratic peace theory, the influence of 
international institutions or public norms against war, “the globalization of production now serves 
as a powerful ‘reserve stabilizer.’”   
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D. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis compares realist fears regarding a power imbalance in the 
Arctic with the possibility that a capitalist peace will override the potential for 
conflict escalation.  To accomplish this it is necessary to explore the validity of 
realist concerns as well as the justification for the proposed capitalist peace 
success in the region.     
Chapter I introduced the situation in the Arctic concerning the newly 
available hydrocarbons and the capabilities gap separating the United States and 
Russian navies relating to surface warfare on the ice-laden waters.  The chapter 
also highlighted realist concerns regarding the unequal capabilities and the time 
and funding required to bring U.S. forces more in line with Russia’s.  Finally, 
Chapter I presented the two theories that will be compared throughout this work, 
realism and the capitalist peace.  Russia’s ailing hydrocarbon industry was 
brought to light as the means for which a capitalist peace might be obtained.   
Chapter II addresses realist concerns.  This chapter provides further detail 
of NSPD-66 as well as the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap and how aspects of both 
appear to coincide with realism’s premise of power equalization.  After examining 
both documents, Chapter II provides contemporary examples of what realists 
may perceive as Russian attempts to either shift the balance of power in Russia’s 
favor or indicate aggression.  This is accomplished by highlighting notable recent 
world events directed by Russia against other states.  The purpose of Chapter II 
is to describe the realist solution proposed by U.S. leadership as well as point to 
some of the events that may have influenced the solution.  Additionally, Chapter 
II shows how certain Russian military incursions since the drafting of both NSPD-
66 and the Navy Arctic Roadmap seem to reinforce realist concerns of a looming 
conflict in the North.  
Chapter III describes the condition of Russia’s hydrocarbon industry as 
well as its dependence on it.  As the world’s leading natural gas exporter as well 
as the world’s second leading oil exporter, the hydrocarbon industry is the 
foundation of Russia’s economy.  Moreover, Russia is the primary supplier of 
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natural gas to Western Europe, a relationship that factors heavily into its national 
security strategy.  Unfortunately, both industries are plagued by antiquated 
means of production and near-depleted reservoirs.  By presenting the importance 
of both oil and natural gas on Russia’s economy as well as natural gas’ pivotal 
role in its national security policy, this chapter illustrates how necessary it is for 
Russia to seek outside assistance.  The need for this outside assistance may 
provide the means for Western corporations to establish FDI within Russia.  
Chapter IV outlines the technological advances the Western hydrocarbon 
industry has relative to Russia.  If Russia were to adopt the technology, it would 
be able to extract more product from its existing reservoirs as well as establish 
new wells in what are considered very difficult locations.  The adoption of 
technology that would ensure long-term economic viability would seem like a 
foregone conclusion.  However, the decision to allow foreign businesses to play 
in a large role in what Russia considers a strategic asset is not an easy one.  
Corporate Russia, like any other capitalist entity, will likely seek the most 
favorable business arrangement it can and in doing so, it may push potential 
investors away.  Chapter IV provides an example of the Russian natural gas 
industry, admitting Western partners only to force the partners out once the 
infrastructure was in place.52     
Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis by describing the potential for 
establishing a capitalist peace in the Arctic in lieu of continuing a realist-oriented 
power struggle.  Additionally, Chapter V suggests two areas for further research.   
By exploring the topics discussed above, this thesis develops a concept 
lacking in the literature: that the United States’ inability to defend its Arctic 
interests militarily may be overcome by the calming effect of economic 
interdependence through the possibility of facilitating Russia’s resource 
extraction. 
                                            
52 Andrew Osborn, “Shell Cedes Control of Sakhalin-2 as Kremlin Exerts its Iron Fist,” The 
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II.  CAUSES FOR REALIST CONCERN 
Threats or seeming threats to…security abound.  Preoccupation 
with identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of 
life.  Relations remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and 
often hostile.53 
Subtle shifts in the balance of power are difficult to detect yet are of 
foremost importance to peace and stability.  And even if detected in 
a timely fashion, policymakers can be slow to react.  But 
maintaining a balance of power favorable to one’s interests is one 
of a president’s key tasks.54 
The above quotations serve to connect realism’s focus on power with 
state leadership’s role in ensuring the state accumulates as much power as 
necessary to ensure security.  Considering the Russian proposal to augment its 
military capabilities in the Arctic, as well as additional Russian actions worldwide 
(both of which are explained in detail below), realists may perceive a Russian 
attempt to shift the balance of power.    
Chapter II opens with an overview of NSPD-66 as well as the Navy Arctic 
Roadmap.  The proposal to enhance the U.S. capacity to fight an Arctic war 
appearing in these documents appears to reflect a realist view.  Following the 
discussion on NSPD-66 and the Roadmap, examples that may justify realist 
arguments are presented.   The purpose of Chapter II is to highlight why realists 
would perceive the potential for military conflict in the Arctic and what their 
proposals are to prepare for it.   
                                            
53 Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of 
Major Wars, ed. Robert Rotberg and Theadore Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/03/detecting_subtle_shifts_in_the_balance_of_po
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A. WASHINGTON’S REALIST POLICIES 
In the final days of his final term, President George W. Bush released 
NSPD-66.  This document, the first of its kind for almost fifteen years, outlined 
the position of the United States regarding its stake in the changing Arctic 
environment and what was to be done to secure its interests and those of the 
nation’s allies in the region.  The directive’s predecessor, Presidential Decision 
Directive-26 (PDD-26), issued by President Clinton in 1994, did not differentiate 
between the Arctic and Antarctica, areas that are dissimilar in geographical 
features and economic potential.   
Though PDD-26 addressed scientific cooperation, national security and 
defense, energy and economic issues, the Clinton administration omitted the 
Arctic from its discussion on maritime and shipping security in its national 
security strategy. This omission, according to Jessie C. Carmen, is a clear 
“symptom of the apparent invisibility of the Arctic issues in [post-Cold War] 
national security policy.”55  Additionally, the National Intelligence Council’s 1998 
publication, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with 
Nongovernmental Experts, mentioned the Arctic only in light of ozone depletion 
with no further discussion regarding the opening of shipping lanes or competition 
for newly uncovered resources.56  The same was true for the U.S. Commission 
on National Security’s 1999 publication, New World Coming: American Security 
in the twenty-first century.57  In short, prior to President Bush’s issuance of 
NSPD-66, the Arctic did not factor heavily into U.S. foreign policy or security 
considerations.  Though scientists have realized the Arctic ice has been steadily 
decreasing for over thirty years at an exponential rate, the possibility that this 
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depletion would make accessible a region long known for its inhospitable climate 
to potential threats has only recently been officially addressed by U.S. 
leadership.58  A possible reason for this increased concern is an increasingly 
assertive and more powerful Russia. 
NSPD-66 begins broadly and gradually narrows its focus toward the 
implementation of various initiatives designed to further secure the Arctic.  
Initially, the directive states:  
The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling 
interests in that region.  This directive takes into account several 
developments, including, among others: 1) Altered national policies 
on homeland security and defense [and] 2) The effects of climate 
change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region.59    
From there, the directive outlines the Bush administration’s national and 
homeland security interests in the area.60 
1. The United States has broad and fundamental national security 
interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either 
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard 
these interests.  These interests include such matters as missile 
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems 
for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, 
and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of 
navigation and overflight. 
2. The United States also has fundamental homeland security 
interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those 
criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States 
vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region. 
3. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as 
such, existing policies and authorities relating to maritime 
areas continue to apply, including those relating to law 
enforcement.  Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing 
and is projected to increase further in coming years.  This  
 
                                            
58 The National Snow and Ice Center, “Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis,” at: 
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59 George W. Bush, “NSPD-66/HSPD-25.” 
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requires the United States to assert a more active and influential 
national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project 
sea power throughout the region.   
4. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority.  The Northwest 
Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the 
Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international 
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage 
through those straits.  Preserving the rights and duties relating 
to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our 
ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including 
through strategic straits.  
 
In sum, the above interests indicate that Washington associates the 
security of the United States at least in part with continued access to the newly 
open waters off its northern coast.  Ensuring access requires a mix of hard and 
soft power with hard power ultimately being the final solution should diplomatic 
negotiations fail.  Recognizing an expanding role in the changing Arctic 
landscape and spurred on by NSPD-66, the U.S. Navy released an exploratory 
review of its future operations in the region.   
Published just eleven months after NSPD-66, the U.S. Navy released its 
Arctic Roadmap to “consider the changing Arctic in developing future policy, 
strategy, force structure and investment.”61  Using NSPD-66 as its “primary 
policy guidance,” the Roadmap recognizes that while “the United States has 
stable relationships with other Arctic nations, the changing environment and 
competition for resources may contribute to increasing tension.”62  To mitigate 
this tension, the Roadmap argues that the Navy must expand its capabilities and 
capacity so that it might “increase its engagement in the region.”63  
In doing so, the Roadmap addresses a need for a fleet readiness 
assessment for operating in the Arctic.  Strategic deterrence, an area identified in 
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both NSPD-66 and in the fleet readiness assessment as one that deserves 
special attention, underscores the possibility that portions of NSPD-66 are 
directed toward a growing and more assertive Russian presence in the North 
versus a need to maintain a presence more in line with law enforcement. 
Strategic deterrence is: 
the actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential 
adversary from initiating an attack or conflict by the threat of 
retaliation by credibly demonstrating to an adversary that the costs 
of an attack would be too great and would outweigh any potential 
gains.64   
For the United States, strategic deterrence has three objectives.  The first is to 
credibly threaten to deny an adversary the benefits or gains sought.  The second 
is to cause unacceptable risk to a potential adversary in the event of an attack.  
The third objective “is to encourage adversary restraint by convincing the 
adversary that not undertaking the action we seek to deter will result in an 
outcome acceptable to him.”65  Further, the U.S. Navy outlines two ways in which 
it fulfills its assigned role in strategic deterrence:   
First, the Navy maintains an ASSURED SECOND-STRIKE 
CAPABILITY. This means that if an enemy were to launch an all-
out attack, the United States could deliver massive retaliation 
(counterattack) even after the attack. The Navy’s fleet ballistic 
missile sub-marines (nuclear) (SSBNs) are the backbone of this 
tactic because of their high probability of surviving a nuclear attack. 
Second, the tactic of CONTROLLED RESPONSE is used. This 
means that the Navy will respond to a partial attack only to the 
degree required. This is hoped to prevent a general nuclear war. 
The SSBN fleet is also the backbone of this tactic.66 
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NSPD-66 and the Arctic Roadmap’s proposed assessment of the Navy’s 
strategic deterrence capability in the Arctic region is equivalent to an 
investigation of its ability to strike with nuclear weapons, something with very little 
relevance when confronting non-state actor threats in the Northwest Passage.  
Further, the Roadmap highlights a need to “Initiate a Capabilities Based 
Assessment for Naval Arctic capabilities.”
67
  
The purpose of the Capabilities Based Assessment is to examine the 
Navy’s “current and required capability to execute undersea warfare, 
expeditionary warfare, strike warfare [and] strategic sealift.”
68
  The acquisition of 
platforms specifically designed for these roles, such as aircraft carriers and 
destroyers, may also prove adequate for deterring terrorist infiltration, but based 
on Russia’s actions and its projected military presence in the North it is more 
logical that the capabilities based assessment is specifically designed to counter 
Russia.  Yet the Navy is not the only branch of the U.S. military using Russian 
actions in the North to justify contemporary policy decisions.  
On 8 August 2007, Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) in Anchorage, Alaska, 
welcomed its first of a projected forty F-22 Raptor aircraft.69  Only the second 
operational military installation to receive the state-of-the-art fighters and the first 
Pacific-based fighter wing to accept them, the decision to station “America’s most 
prominent air-superiority fighter”70 so close to Russia’s border may be an attempt 
by Washington to ensure the region’s balance of power remains in favor of the 
United States.  In 2000, when the Air Force was considering locations to base 
the second wing of F-22s after Langley AFB, Virginia, fielded the initial delivery; 
the locations under consideration were Eglin and Tyndall AFBs in Northwest 
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Florida, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and Elmendorf.71   Though political and 
infrastructure considerations likely influenced the final outcome, the security of 
having a multi-role, stealth fighter  in close proximity to Russia just as likely 
added weight to the final decision.  For its part, the Russian military has not 
proved the decision to expand the U.S. presence in the North to be a poor one.72  
The examples below illustrate recent events where Russia has worked against 
the other Arctic states.  The intent is to illustrate why realists believe there is 
potential for a military confrontation with Russia in the North and why they are 
proposing a buildup in their nations’ military capabilities.  The remainder of this 
section details some of these actions.  
B. MOSCOW’S REALIST POLICIES 
The election of President Vladimir Putin in 2000 brought with it a shift in 
Russian perception of the western world.73  Putin’s 2007 speech delivered at the  
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Munich Security Conference both “surprised and disappointed” American 
leadership regarding Russian perception of the United States.74  According to 
Putin:  
We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles 
of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter 
of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One 
state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has 
overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the 
economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on 
other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?75 
Later in the speech, Putin leveled his comments at NATO, calling its 
perceived expansion troubling and the organization’s entry into conflict illogical: 
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any 
relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring 
security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the 
right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?76 
Today we are witnessing…a situation in which countries that forbid 
the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous 
criminals are airily participating in military operations that are 
difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these 
conflicts are killing people - hundreds and thousands of civilians!77 
Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, have since reinforced this anti-
Western rhetoric with actions designed to both bolster Russian morale as well as 
send a signal to the United States and the West that a separate, distinct and 
more powerful Russia is the way ahead.   
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1. Russia’s Arctic Policies 
According to Katarzyna Kysk, “Russian attitudes towards international 
relations in the [Arctic] region have been dominated by what can be 
characterized as a Russian variation on classical realist thinking.”78  Russia’s 
perception that the United States and NATO are seeking to dominate the High 
North has influenced Russian policy in ways that do parallel realist theory.  The 
policy documents and military actions relating specifically to the North as well as 
other Russian military endeavors around the world may indicate that Russia 
senses a power struggle between itself and what it perceives is an encroaching 
and dominant United States and NATO.   
In September 2008, the Kremlin publically released The Foundations of 
Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond.  This document 
calls for the creation of “general purpose military formations…capable of 
ensuring security under various military and political circumstances” for the 
Arctic.  Additionally, officials are proposing the Arctic become the “leading 
strategic and resource base for Russia” by 2016.79  Among Russia’s other 
military plans, which, according to Kysk, could increase the navy’s striking power 
in the Arctic, is the purchase of five to six aircraft carrier squadrons, twenty new 
multipurpose corvettes and twenty frigates.80   
Released in May 2009, the Russian Security Council’s Russian Security 
Strategy through 2020, defines the foreign and domestic threats and suggests 
actions that will ensure the security and development of Russia.81  The document 
acknowledges the role hydrocarbons play in the state’s national security and   
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recognizes that Russia’s international position is achieved chiefly by the political 
use of these natural resources.  The strategy further notes that Russia is 
prepared for the use of military force to solve problems resulting from foreign 
encroachment on resource-rich territory Russia feels it rightfully owns.82  
It is likely not a coincidence that the security documents of Russia and the 
United States were created around the same time.  When one nation issues its 
stance in the North, a realist response would be to issue a counter designed to 
shore up and address the differences.  It can be argued that Russia has taken 
the more aggressive stance on shoring up the differences by moving beyond the 
issuance of policy.  As will be illustrated below, Russian actions have reinforced 
the realist view that political power plays are underway and serve to justify their 
desire for increased Arctic military capabilities. 
2. Russian Military Incursions  
Since 2007, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
fighter aircraft have intercepted Russian nuclear-weapon-capable bombers an 
estimated 12 to 18 times.  One of the most recent incidents occurred on 25 
August 2010 when two Canadian Air Force CF-18A Hornets departed Canadian 
Forces Base Cold Lake in Alberta to intercept two Tu-95 Bear bombers.83  The 
bombers did not enter Canadian sovereign airspace, but they did break the 300-
mile buffer zone that Canada claims.84  Though this incident occurred in 
Canadian airspace, the relatively small stretch of Alaskan coastline is not 
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immune from the probing of Russian aircraft.  In February 2008, two F-22s based 
in Elmendorf intercepted and escorted two Tu-95s out of the U.S. buffer zone.  
The following month, two F-15C Eagles, also based in Elmendorf, conducted the 
same mission.85   
Further west, Russian antagonizing of U.S. military assets was more 
aggressive.  While the United States was conducting exercises in international 
waters near South Korea in March 2009, two Il-38 May maritime-patrol aircraft 
overflew the U.S. aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis at an altitude of 500 feet.  
The following day, two Tu-95s overflew the USS Stennis and the command ship 
USS Blue Ridge multiple times at an altitude of 2000 feet.86  A similar incident 
occurred in September 2010 on the Barents Sea.  On 10 September, an Il-38 
flew 50 feet from the side of the guided missile frigate, USS Taylor.  The 
following day, a Russian Helix helicopter circled the vessel at low altitude.87  
Closer to U.S. shores, the pair of Akula-class Russian attack submarines 
appearing off the Eastern Seaboard in August 2009 caused Defense Department 
officials to worry.88  Though the United States and Russia routinely placed 
submarines off one another’s coasts during the Cold War, the White House 
commented that the August incident was “the first time in roughly a decade that 
we’ve seen this kind of behavior.”89  
Norway has also experienced Russian incursions.  For a time in 2008, 
fighters launched to intercept Russian warplanes coming close to their ADIZ on 
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average once per week.  The Russian navy has also conducted naval 
maneuvers amidst Norway’s oil and gas platforms in the North Sea.  The aircraft 
sorties, which accompany these maneuvers, have grounded all of Norway’s 
offshore helicopter flights due to the danger of a potential mid-air collision, 
causing the production companies a loss of revenue.  Perhaps more troubling 
was the mock bombing run conducted against Norway’s northern command 
center at Bodø as well as three other unpublicized locations.90 
Though all incursions were detected early and monitored constantly by 
allied military assets, realists may interpret the Russian aircraft and naval 
maneuvers as an attempt by Russia to disrupt the balance of power.    Yet these 
are not the only events that have fueled realists’ anxiety over Russian actions.  
Russian actions in other areas of the world may appear to realists as indications 
of a Russian effort to reassert itself as a world power that is willing and capable 
of influencing world affairs.  
3. The Georgian War 
The Russian-Georgian war fundamentally altered western perceptions of 
Russia.  According to authors Eugene Rumer and Angela Stent: 
The Russian–Georgian war marked the end of a phase in East–
West relations, that began with the blossoming of perestroika in the 
Soviet Union, gained momentum with the collapse of Communism 
in Eastern Europe and eventually the Soviet Union itself, survived 
the turbulence of the Yeltsin years and regained momentum early 
in the Bush–Putin era. For nearly two decades, US policy toward 
Russia was guided by a commitment to integrate Russia into the 
West and a belief that the new Russia sought a genuine 
partnership with the West. The war and its aftermath sent the 
United States back to the drawing board, seeking to redefine the 
relationship with a different Russia than it had initially anticipated.91 
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The war underscored major sources of disagreement between the United States 
and Russia. State leadership’s opinions vary concerning the causes of the 
conflict and who was responsible for escalation, but Russian and American 
viewpoints are in opposition.   
The Bush Administration’s position following Russia’s incursion into 
Georgia was very much anti-Russia.  Despite Presidents Bush and Putin signing 
a “framework agreement” declaring that “the era in which the United States and 
Russia considered one another an enemy or strategic threat has ended” only four 
months previously, Russia executed and continued their operation in the face of 
U.S. opposition.92  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared that: 
Russia’s behavior…called into question the entire premise of that 
dialogue and has profound implications for our security relationship 
going forward, both bilaterally and with NATO.  If Russia does not 
step back from its aggressive posture and actions in Georgia, the 
U.S.-Russian relationship could be adversely affected for years to 
come.93   
Russian leadership, in contrast, not only disregarded U.S. opposition but 
also blamed the United States for initiating the conflict.  In August 2008, Prime 
Minister Putin openly accused the United States of encouraging Georgia to 
attack the region of South Ossetia for the purpose of benefitting either John 
McCain’s or Barack Obama’s presidential campaign.  He also asserted, “U.S. 
citizens were indeed in the area in conflict.  They were acting in implementing 
those orders doing as they were ordered, and the only one who can give such 
orders is their leader.”94  Additionally, on 5 November 2008, Russian President 
Medvedev reinforced Putin’s earlier remarks.  He declared that U.S. “selfish” 
foreign policy was the cause of Russia’s invasion.  He continued by stating, “The 
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conflict in the Caucasus was used as a pretext for sending NATO warships to the 
Black Sea and then for the forceful foisting on Europe of America’s anti-missile 
systems.”95  These accusations reverberated throughout Washington and likely 
influenced the drafting of policy designed to confront the changing Arctic 
landscape.  With the anxiety over a militarily aggressive Russia permeating what 
was once a hopeful pathway to international cooperation, actions by the former 
Soviet Union to influence U.S. allies have also increased concern over the states’ 
future relationship. 
4. Tensions 0ver Manas Air Base 
The Transit Center at Manas is an Operation Enduring Freedom staging 
area for NATO strike and transport aircraft flying troops and supplies into and out 
of Afghanistan.  The air base is located at Manas International Airport, near 
Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan.  Since the arrival of the U.S. military in 
December 2001, the facility has moved approximately 15,000 service members 
and 500 tons of cargo monthly into Afghanistan and has become the primary 
resupply area in the north after the United States removed all assets from Karshi-
Khanabad in southern Uzbekistan in 2005.96   
The issue with Manas, as it relates unease over Russian foreign policy, 
occurred shortly after President Obama’s inauguration.  In February 2009, the 
Kyrgyz parliament voted 78 to 1 to force the Americans out of Manas.97  Citing a 
U.S. decision not to renegotiate the terms of the facility’s lease, Kyrgyzstan 
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that the United States had 180 days to 
vacate the base.  The verdict passed shortly after Russia applied pressure on 
Kyrgyzstan by first launching an attack on Kyrgyzstan’s internet infrastructure in 
the weeks leading up to the decision, something other ex-Soviet states 
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experienced when under pressure from Moscow.  Next, Russia agreed to loan 
Kyrgyzstan $2.2 billion as well as give $350 million in write-offs and grants.98  
These actions, put together, effectively pressured the Kyrgyz government into 
dismissing the United States. 
In order to secure the base for the future, U.S. officials agreed to increase 
the amount paid for use from $85 million to $161 million, an amount equal to 
seven percent of the Kyrgyzstan government’s annual budget.99  If there was any 
doubt as to the Russian influence on the Kyrgyz decision, Russian statements 
following the Kyrgyz policy reversal allowing the U.S. forces to remain in the 
country provided a clear indication of who was behind the seemingly surprise 
decision to expel the United States.  According to Andrei Nesterenko, a 
spokesperson for the Russian foreign ministry, “The Kyrgyz leadership has 
repeatedly stated that the decision to close the base was final and not subject to 
revision.”  Additionally, a Russian senior foreign ministry official noted, “The news 
that the base would be preserved was, for us, a very unpleasant surprise.”100 
 The U.S. presence so close to the Russian border was troublesome to 
Russian leadership.  As President Putin mentioned in his Munich speech, the 
perceived encroachment of NATO is a threat to national security for the Russian 
Federation.  The attempt to expel U.S. forces in order to lessen U.S. power in the 
area is indicative of a realist solution and when it failed, the Russian officials’ 
reactions served to confirm this.  
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5. Arktika 2007 
One the most telling aspects of Russia’s assertive nature in the Arctic 
occurred on 2 August 2007. On that morning, two submersibles, Mir 1 and Mir 2, 
on the privately funded scientific expedition Arktika 2007 descended nearly 
14,000 feet to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, obtained samples of the sediment 
and placed a three-foot-tall titanium Russian flag on the seabed.101  As if to add 
an exclamation point to a cause beginning almost six years earlier, Russia made 
a very public, very loud claim that an over 460,000 square mile area of the Arctic 
Ocean, the size of France and Germany combined, was rightfully theirs.102 
Hoping to gain exclusive rights to a section of the hydrocarbon-rich region, 
Russia first submitted its claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) in December 2001 but was subsequently rebuked when the 
Convention returned the claim asking for further evidence that Russia’s 
continental landmass extended so far into the seabed.  The purpose of the 
samples acquired during Arktika 2007 was to bolster their territorial claim and the 
mission may have gone relatively unnoticed by the world had the submersibles 
not placed the flag and broadcast its placement for the world to see.103   
 Members of the State Duma publically hailed the mission as “a new stage 
of developing Russia’s polar riches” and declared the expedition “fully in line with 
Russia’s strategic interests” and expressed pride that Russia “remains the leader 
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in conquering the Arctic.”104  North America’s leadership had a very different 
reaction. Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay declared, “This isn’t the 15th 
century.  You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘We’re 
claiming this territory.’”105  Additionally, United States State Department deputy 
spokesman Tom Casey proclaimed, “I’m not sure of whether they’ve put a metal 
flag, a rubber flag or a bed sheet on the ocean floor.  Either way, it doesn’t have 
any legal standing or effect on [Russia’s territorial] claim.”106    
C.  NO CHANGE ON THE HORIZON 
Portions of NSPD-66 and the Navy Arctic Roadmap appear to be attempts 
at countering Russian activities in the Arctic.  Considering Russia’s “increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy actions,” these documents seem justified in checking 
what appears to be a more capable Russian military.107  Forecasting a coming 
military threat in the area, a realist response would be to strengthen military 
capabilities in preparation.  Though the proposed investments in war materiel 
may deter conflict escalation between Russia and the United States in the Arctic, 
the question of their necessity remains.  With a 10-year requirement to 
manufacture an Arctic-capable vessel, even if construction were to begin 
immediately, the Russians would be too far ahead of U.S. capabilities for U.S. 
warships to become a threat.  Perhaps the Obama Administration realizes this or 
perhaps the current recession prevents policy pursuance, but the President’s 
fiscal year 2011 budget request includes no funding for new Arctic vessels.108    
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This leaves the door open for other means of calming Arctic tensions.  Before 
discussing the prospect of a capitalist peace, it is necessary to understand 
Russia’s need for FDI. 
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III. RUSSIA’S DEPENDENCE ON AND THE CONDITION OF ITS 
HYDROCARBONS 
Almost half of Russia’s national income and approximately 65 percent of 
its foreign exchange earnings come from its energy sector.109  The nation’s 
proven oil reserves place it firmly in the top ten international oil states and its 
production output makes it the world’s number two oil exporter behind Saudi 
Arabia.  Russia also has substantial proven natural gas reserves and is the 
world’s number one exporter of natural gas.110  As a result, the Russian economy 
is heavily dependent on oil and natural gas exports while also being subordinate 
to oil price fluctuations and the uninterrupted flow of natural gas.  Though 
important, gross domestic product is not the only aspect of Russia’s welfare 
associated with hydrocarbons. 
The Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2020 declares, 
“Energy security is the most important element in Russia’s national security.”111 
With the welfare of the state so closely tied to the energy market and, as will be 
explained below, the government so closely tied to the energy corporations, it is 
not hard to see why security and energy go hand-in-hand.  This fusion of policy 
and resources is becoming a liability as Russia’s historic ability to meet customer 
demand is faltering.  The decline in production is due in large part to a decline in 
productive energy deposits.  Russian leadership’s new focus on the Arctic is 
more than just an effort to expand its GDP.  They are aware of the fact that 
tapping into Arctic deposits is also a strategic imperative.112   
Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure is failing.  Its historically productive oil 
and gas fields are beginning to show signs of exhaustion and the industry’s 
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infrastructure has received very little attention since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Because the neglect is so widespread, there are insufficient funds to exploit 
untouched oil fields and there is insufficient indigenous technology to exploit the 
gas fields in the Arctic, both of which are necessary for Russia’s continued 
viability.  Additionally, the transport of both products may no longer be feasible if 
the transportation system is not sufficiently upgraded.  If allowed to continue 
operations without regard for the industry’s deterioration, Russia’s economy and 
security will be in jeopardy. 
Russia has little choice but to look to the Arctic for new sources of natural 
gas and oil.  In doing so, it exposes a historically proud society to the prospect of 
outside assistance, for without this help the nation cannot survive.113  The 
purpose of Chapter III is to highlight the problems associated with Russia’s 
current hydrocarbon industry and to outline what investments are required to 
bring it up to a point where it is sustainable for the long term.  The chapter opens 
with a brief discussion of the oil industry followed by a more detailed examination 
of the natural gas industry.  Chapter III concludes with an overview off the 
difficulties associated with harvesting hydrocarbons in the harsh Arctic 
environment. 
A. OIL 
If there is at least one positive aspect of global warming, it is the 
uncovering of natural resources in the Arctic such as oil.  The idea that the world 
will one day run out of crude is not new nor is it entirely without merit. A 2007 
report by the Energy Watch Group, published one year before the U.S. 
Geological Survey announced its findings of vast hydrocarbon reservoirs in the 
Arctic, declared “peak oil is now.”114  This finding not only shifts the timeline much 
earlier than other peak oil theories mentioned in the article, but also challenges 
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those who believe the theory of peak oil is unfounded.115  Perhaps the most 
startling aspect of the Energy Watch Group’s article is that after the peak the 
declining rate of the world’s supply is much steeper than originally forecast.   
In every oil-producing region of the world, the large oil deposits are 
developed first and only after they become exhausted are the smaller deposits 
developed. As soon as the first large fields of a region have passed their 
production peak, an increasing number of new and generally smaller fields must 
be developed to compensate for the decline in the production base. From there 
on, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain the rate of the production growth. A 
race begins which can be described as follows:  More and more large oil fields 
show declining production rates. The resulting gap is filled by bringing into 
production smaller and smaller fields. However, these smaller fields reach their 
peak much faster and then contribute to the overall production decline. 
Consequently, the region's production profile resulting from the aggregation of 
the individual fields’ production profiles becomes more and more skewed and the 
collective decline of the producing fields becomes steeper and steeper. This 
decline is compensated for by again connecting more ever smaller fields, thus 
creating a seemingly inescapable cycle.116  Breaking the cycle can only be 
accomplished by tapping into fields capable of producing yields similar to those 
experienced from the original large deposits. 
For nations dependent on oil as a principal source of revenue, a reduction 
in supply will devastate their economies.  For Russia, the devastation will be an 
economic catastrophe.  Currently, Russia produces approximately ten million 
barrels of oil per day and of this 75 percent is exported, making Russia the 
world’s second leading oil exporter after Saudi Arabia.117  Although upswings in 
the price of oil have historically created enormous sums of money for the state,  
 
                                            
115 Ugo Bardi, "Peak Oil: The Four Stages of a New Idea," Energy 34, no. 3 (March 2009). 
116 Zittel and Schindler, "Crude Oil the Supply Outlook," 9. 
117 Howard, Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources, 143. 
 40
just as quickly the money can disappear altogether.  On average, a $1 per barrel 
change in oil prices results in a $1.4 billion change in Russian government 
revenues in the same direction.118   
The political chaos of the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union took its toll on the oil industry, as did the poor price of oil during the mid-
1990s.  Oil’s recovery around the turn of the century, however, helped Russia 
emerge from a near depression and return to the world stage.  When Russia’s 
$200 billion economy nearly defaulted, for example, oil helped the gross 
domestic product reach $1.4 trillion by 2008; but this was also the last year of 
relative prosperity.119  In April 2008, a Lukoil executive revealed that Russia’s 
output had fallen for the first time in a decade and appeared to continue its 
decline for the foreseeable future.120   
The reasons for the decline in production vary but stem primarily from a 
lack of fiscal responsibility.  Despite the high revenues, the industry was plagued 
by poor regulation, little reinvestment into infrastructure, overreliance on aging 
equipment and faith that fields in use could be sustained indefinitely.  Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the discovery and development of new sources 
for oil production have been almost nonexistent.  In 2006, for example, 24 
percent of Russia’s oil came from fields that had already produced 60 percent of 
their total volume.121  Recognizing the potential for disaster, almost a decade 
before the production decline set in, President Putin called on industry executives 
to “halt the lagging growth in reserves relative to the volume of mineral resources 
extracted and expand the study and exploitation for the resources of the [Arctic] 
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continental shelf and open seas.”122  Few championed the president’s cause.  As 
of early 2007, Russia had only 58 wells in the Arctic versus Norway’s 1,500.123  
However, Russia’s reluctance to drill is not tied to a lack of proven reserves, only 
its ability to exploit them. 
British Petroleum analysts estimate that Russia possesses approximately 
80 billion barrels in untapped reserves though Oil and Gas Journal estimates the 
figure closer to 60 billion barrels.124  Both of these figures pale in comparison to 
leading industry figures who believe there may be as much as 100 billion 
barrels.125  Thus, the problem is not discovering the reserves; the problem is 
developing them and overcoming historically poor extraction techniques. 
The Soviet model of oil production still in use today is underscored by a 
reliance on relative short-term benefits versus industrial longevity.  Always 
adhering to the goal of meeting the mandated end-of-year target, the industry’s 
method of extraction is characterized by the drilling of many low-yield, shallow 
wells versus fewer high-yield deeper wells.  Though this may be partially due to 
the poor-quality Soviet steel being unable to drill through harder ground, a more 
realistic culprit is the backwards incentives proposed by Moscow.  Oil well 
operators have historically been rewarded based on the number of meters drilled 
rather than the size of the deposit discovered.  This policy crippled the industry’s 
longevity as industry leaders came to rely on overly rapid production of oil fields 
resulting in output being “much lower than would have been technically feasible 
had the fields been developed more carefully…Unlike the West, there was no 
incentive to invest time and money in improving production technologies or 
developing enhanced recovery techniques.”126    
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The brief turnaround experienced at the turn of the twentieth century 
indicated Russian recognition of its previous mistakes and an attempt to regain 
some of what it potentially left behind in its oil reserves.  Reworking some of its 
extraction methods using relatively basic engineering techniques, Russian firms 
were able to increase production to almost 10 million barrels per day (bpd) from 6 
million bpd.  By 2008, however, the trend reversed and deposits in the two 
largest producing regions, at Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in Western 
Siberia and in the Volga-Urals, both of which combine to form two thirds of 
Russia’s overall yield, began to run dry.127   
Russia is also experiencing difficulties with regard to efficiently exporting 
oil.  Transneft, a state-owned corporation, owns Russia’s entire oil pipeline 
system.  Due to neglected infrastructure as well as a lack of expansion, the 
current methods used to transport oil are incapable of moving the amount of 
crude producers aspire to export.  It is estimated that only about 4 million bpd of 
the 6.7 million barrels designated for export are capable of being moved via 
pipeline.  The remainder is shipped via more expensive methods such as by 
rail.128  Given the historically fluctuating price of oil, the use of more costly 
transportation to satisfy export market demand may equate to a net loss if prices 
fall too far.  Assuming peak oil is correct this loss will eventually be overcome 
when prices are driven up by international demand as world supply begins to 
dwindle. However, the net loss may continue indefinitely if less expensive 
sources come on line and delay the arrival of peak oil.  Once oil has peaked and 
is too expensive to extract, Russia will have to rely primarily on gas revenues; the 
oil windfall profit tax will cease to fatten its coffers.  
The International Energy Agency predicts oil prices will average $100 
leading up to 2015 at which time they will steadily increase to $120 per barrel by 
2030.129  The Russian government, much more optimistically than the Energy 
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Watch Group, predicts that at its current rate of production the nation will reach 
its maximum output in 2020, versus 2007, at which point production rates will 
freefall.130  In short, without exploiting its Arctic reserves, Russia’s ability to 
remain a cornerstone of the world’s oil market is doomed.  Recognizing this 
state’s precarious position, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev addressed the 
nation in 2009 stressing the need for Russia to break from its dependence on an 
energy-based economy.131  However, as of yet Russia has not migrated away 
from its reliance on the oil and gas market. 
B. NATURAL GAS 
Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter and the primary natural 
gas supplier to Europe and adjacent former Soviet states.132  According to 
Charles Emmerson, Associate Director of the World Economic Forum: 
Were Russian oil production to peak, the direct consequences 
would be mostly economic…But a shortfall in Russia’s production 
of natural gas would be altogether more serious, spelling disaster 
for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and undermining Russia’s 
leverage over its European consumers.133  
This leverage has become a major component of Russia’s national 
security and relates directly to its dealings with the West.  For example, Germany 
imports 39 percent of its domestically consumed natural gas from Russia and 
Austria imports 69 percent.  Former Soviet states such as Moldova, Latvia, 
Georgia and Estonia all receive 100 percent of their natural gas from Russia.134  
As such, Russia commands an enviable business position within Europe and 
surrounding areas; if communities wish to stay warm they are obligated to 
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purchase the bulk of their heat source from one supplier.  Russia’s monopoly on 
natural gas is a cornerstone of its economy and because of its monopoly status 
incentives to improve the industry are virtually nonexistent.   
Gazprom, a state-owned corporation, controls the vast majority of Russian 
natural gas sources and its entire pipeline infrastructure.  Gazprom is also the 
only corporation permitted to export natural gas, thereby allowing the state direct 
influence on all product required by NATO allies.  The Russian state’s influence 
on Gazprom’s business practices may bode well for the state’s foreign policy but 
this influence also casts doubt on the corporation’s ability to sustain operations 
into the future. 
Gazprom emerged out of the former Soviet Gas Ministry, which was 
created to oversee the USSR’s newly emerging natural gas industry in 1965.  In 
1989, the ministry changed its name to Gazprom and, in 1993, the corporation 
reorganized into a shareholding company known as RAO Gazprom.  Finally, in 
1998, the company adopted its current name, OAO Gazprom.  In 2005, the 
Russian state became the corporation’s majority shareholder by amassing 51 
percent of all shares.  The state’s heavy involvement resulted in a mix of 
corporate stakeholders and decision makers that seemingly work against one 
another thus forming a very non-traditional business model.135   According to Ian 
Hague, co-founder of a New York-based fund that invests in Russian industry, 
“[Gazprom] has many of the attributes of a company, like outside shareholders.  
It files accounts.  It talks to investors.  But the economics of what it does has very 
little resemblance to a profit maximizing firm.”136  The policies enacted as a result 
of state ownership are responsible for the aged and degraded infrastructure that 
Gazprom is using to not only supply its domestic market but also its heavily 
dependent export customers as well. 
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Due of state influence, Gazprom is forced to supply the domestic market 
with inexpensive, government subsidized, natural gas.  Russia’s Federal Tariff 
Service establishes fixed wholesale prices at which Gazprom must sell its entire 
domestic market-bound product.  For example, in 2003 Russians were charged 
between $15 and $20 per thousand cubic meter (tcm) for natural gas.137  In 
contrast, European countries during the same period paid from $159 per tcm in 
Finland to $735 per tcm in Denmark.138  Since the domestic market accounts for 
70 percent of Gazprom’s quantity sold, the exported 30 percent is the only 
source of income from gas sales.  To compensate for this fiscally poor 
arrangement, Gazprom has invested in areas unrelated to natural gas production 
and transportation.139  This has understandably generated criticism from both the 
citizens of Russia as well as some of Russia’s foreign gas customers who 
recognize that diverting scarce funds away from infrastructure may impact their 
own future supply.140    
The natural gas infrastructure currently in use traces its lineage to massive 
investments, which took place during the late Soviet period.  As a result, 40 
percent of the pipelines are between 21 and 33 years old and 20 percent are 
over 33 years old.141  In 2005, Gazprom announced its intent to provide natural 
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gas to all Russians but as of 2008, only 61.7 percent of Russians are “gasified” 
and only 4 percent of those living in Siberia (where most of the gas is harvested) 
are connected to the pipeline network.142  The problem is incentive.  Pipeline 
construction and maintenance is expensive and due to the limited population in 
the eastern areas and the artificially low price they would pay for gas, it is not in 
the company’s financial interest to provide gas to its fellow citizens.  Because of 
the lack of local incentive, the only profit gaining enterprises for the corporation 
are gas exports and the additional business ventures.  In 2006, President 
Vladimir Putin commented on Russia’s notoriously small investment in its energy 
sector, stating that “not many people know that last year investment in capital 
assets came to $121 billion and of this total only $8.7 billion was in the oil and 
gas sector.”143  The unfortunate conclusion from these figures is that only 7 
percent of Russia’s total investment is allocated to the industry that provides over 
60 percent of its exports and almost 50 percent of its state revenues.144   
Climate change is working against the Russians as well.  Sixty percent of 
the Russian continent is located in permafrost regions, which, due to global 
warming, are beginning to thaw.  The thaw is causing structural foundations 
designed only for frozen, stable surfaces to shift and buckle.145  Because of the 
warming climate, the number of accidents occurring annually on the almost 
220,000 miles of pipeline (oil and gas combined) is increasing.  Approximately 21 
percent of the accidents are the result of mechanical damage occurring due to 
the “deformation and weakening of the foundations anchored in permafrost.”146   
Repair of these lines is costly and shifts funding away from other infrastructure  
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investments as well as from remedying the most pressing issue for Gazprom and 
the Russian government, its depleting supply of natural gas. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2008 
Country Analysis Brief: 
Gazprom’s natural gas production forecast calls for only modest 
growth.  Russia’s natural gas sector has been stunted primarily due 
to aging fields, state regulation, Gazprom’s monopolistic control 
over industry, and insufficient export pipelines.  Three major fields 
(called the “Big Three”) in Western Siberia…comprise more than 70 
percent of Gazprom’s total natural gas production, but these fields 
are now in decline, and the government and Gazprom each project 
steep declines in Russia’s natural gas output between 2008 and 
2020.147 
The EIA further notes that Gazprom’s annual investments have totaled 
approximately $7 billion since 2003 yet the bulk of this amount has been diverted 
to foreign acquisitions and additional export infrastructure.  According to EIA 
calculations, Russia must invest at least $11 billion annually to bring new sources 
on line as well as upgrade its ailing domestic systems in order to meet forecast 
demand.  If this investment is not forthcoming, the natural gas industry’s output 
will decline at a greater rate than it has in recent years.148  The nation’s 
dependence on natural gas exports for both income and national security is 
quickly becoming a problem.   
As currently online natural gas deposits run dry, the international 
consumers will seek additional sources of fuel.  Once the new infrastructure is in 
place with these new sources, Russia and Europe’s natural gas relationship, a 
cornerstone of the Russian economy and security strategy, will weaken.  As 
stated above, the natural gas infrastructure is almost entirely dependent on the 
revenue generated from export sales.  Lack of revenue will cause the 
infrastructure to decay still further, eventually deteriorating to the point where it is  
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no longer capable of sustaining the domestic natural gas distribution.   In order to 
pacify its customer base, Russia must tap into the Arctic’s natural gas deposits 
before its supply becomes exhausted. 
Russia’s natural gas industry cannot afford to have its customer base 
abandon the relationship before these new fields are brought online.  Not only 
are Europeans wary of Russia’s monopolistic status, they are also unhappy with 
Russia’s history of unpredictable delivery.149   
Currently, Russia’s gas exports to Europe must be piped through 
intermediary nations such as Ukraine, which can negatively affect both producer 
and consumer.    Using these third parties generates additional costs (making the 
supplier less competitive) and potential delays in shipment (making the supplier 
less reliable) as disputes develop between the supplier and intermediary 
countries, in this case, Ukraine.  In 2006, for example, Russia cut supply to 
Ukraine after the latter refused to pay a Russian mandated five hundred percent 
price increase per TCM of gas.  Since 80 percent of Europe’s Russian gas 
supply comes via Ukraine, Europe found itself in the middle of one of the coldest 
winters on record with few alternatives as its additional suppliers were already 
producing at maximum capacity.150  Recognizing this problem, Russia is 
proposing a new pipeline, the Nordstream, which would allow Russian gas to 
travel to Europe by way of the Baltic Sea versus the overland route, thereby 
eliminating the contention caused by third-party involvement.151  Russia lost 
billions by shutting off the gas to Ukraine and, by default, losing its European 
customers.  While there is no guarantee that European supplies will not be  
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interrupted in the future, the Nordstream project assures that if the supply is once 
again cut to Ukraine, the European line will remain open.  In short, as long as the 
gas is flowing, Russia reaps the rewards.   
In 2007, Russia’s combined natural gas production fell by 1.3 percent.152  
The industry publicly blamed Europe’s unusually warm summer for the decline as 
the region demanded less, yet the truth was far more troubling for Russian 
leadership.  In reality, the decline was attributed to the industry’s main source of 
gas, the enormous fields in a region of Western Siberia known as Nadym Pur 
Taz, being unable to fulfill obligations due to depleted supplies.153   Because of 
diminishing supplies, 2008 European natural gas contracts were met only by the 
transshipment of gas from Turkmenistan.154  Clearly a stopgap measure, this 
cannot sustain the industry in the long term.    
What is needed is a new source and the Arctic offers the only foreseeable 
solution.  By 2020, the Russian gas industry “expects half its natural gas to come 
from the northwest Russian Arctic: the low-lying Yamal Peninsula, protruding into 
the frozen Kara Sea, and the offshore Shtokman field…Yamal alone is forecast 
to provide 75 to 115 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas as early 2015, 
rising to 310 to 360 bcm by 2030.”155  These figures resonate closely with the 
policies in Russia’s National Security Policy as well as its National Energy 
Strategy.   
With the state’s stability so closely enmeshed with its ability to harvest and 
distribute natural gas, it is understandable that the Yamal region is garnering so 
much attention.  Gazprom, and, by default, the state, has earmarked Yamal as 
the best hope for further prosperity.  This is due not only to its yield potential, 
                                            





but also due to what corporate leadership perceives as a relatively quick timeline 
from its current state to that of full production.156  
C. SO CLOSE AND YET SO FAR 
The costs of exploiting hydrocarbons in the Arctic are staggering due to 
the extremely harsh environmental conditions in the region as well as the 
deposits’ isolation relative to the consumers.  The sun may not appear above the 
horizon for weeks at a time during the winter.  During the months with abundant 
sunlight, the angle at which the rays strike the earth’s surface is much less than 
90 degrees, which greatly reduces the amount of incident solar radiation.  
Developments in the Arctic waters are subject to not only the same conditions, 
but must also contend with up to three-meter-thick pack ice and drifting icebergs 
weighing up to 10,000 tons.157  Corporations wishing to conduct oil and natural 
gas exploration above the Arctic Circle encounter variables not experienced in 
their more southern areas of operation.  As such, the cost of doing business can 
be as much as 1.5 to 2 times greater than operations conducted in climates that 
are more temperate.158  Just a few of the obstacles corporations must contend 
with are,159 
 Weather requiring specially-designed equipment capable of withstanding 
the frigid temperatures; 
 On lands, poor soil conditions requiring additional site preparation to 
prevent equipment and structures from sinking; 
 The characteristically marshy Arctic tundra precluding exploration 
activities during the warmer months of the year; 
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 The icepack at sea not only becoming a threat to offshore facilities, but 
also hindering the shipment of personnel, materials, equipment, and 
product for long periods;  
 Long supply lines from the world’s manufacturing centers require 
equipment redundancy and a larger inventory of spare parts to insure 
reliability; 
 Limited transport capability and long supply lines reduce the transport 
options and increase transportation costs; and 
 Higher wages and salaries are required to induce personnel to work in the 
harsh Arctic environment. 
 
Further, oil and natural gas developments in the Yamal Peninsula are 
recognized as some of the most difficult to construct as the area’s weather 
phenomena are even more extreme than that of other Arctic regions.  According 
to a Cambridge Energy Research Associates report,160  
Intermittent permafrost becomes continuous, winds rise to a steady 
40 m per second, wind-driven water up to 10 m deep covers the 
low-lying land several months of the year, and solid ground gives 
way to friable sand that offers little support to drill pads or to 
pipelines and other infrastructure. In winter, instead of soil there is a 
frozen mixture of one part sand to four parts of ice, shot through 
with salt. At greater depths one encounters cryopegs—liquid 
saltwater lenses that slide under pressure, further weakening the 
load-bearing capacity of the soil….The most difficult part is getting 
gas and liquids to market as well as getting equipment and materiel 
in. 
Overcoming such obstacles is not impossible.  The problem of pack ice, 
which runs the risk of not only pulling drill rigs off location but also crushing the 
rigs all together, may be overcome with drill ships, capable of retreating from the 
area before the ice reaches their location.  Another proposal is the construction 
of artificial islands in shallow waters thereby allowing the use of more 
conventional onshore equipment.161  While such proposals are technically 
feasible, their realization is near impossible for Russia to attempt unilaterally. 
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State-imposed restrictions on Arctic development designed to strengthen 
the state also detract from innovation.  In July 2008, Igor Sechin, deputy prime 
minister and former chairman of the state-owned oil corporation Rosneft, limited 
the pool of allowable corporations that may explore the potentially lucrative Arctic 
hydrocarbon deposits.  According to Federal Law 129, the only companies 
allowed to harvest the strategic resources located on the Russian continental 
shelf  must be “Russian legal entities established in the Russian Federation, with 
over 50 percent of voting shares controlled by the Russian federal government, 
and have at least five years’ experience in developing strategic resources on the 
Russian continental shelf.”162 In effect, the only corporations allowed to develop 
the Arctic areas for oil and gas exploitation are Gazprom and Rosneft, hampering 
the possibility for industry competition and the resultant product innovation.  This 
will not help Russia’s need for a short-term solution to the problem of near-
depleted natural gas fields and hard-to-reach oil deposits. 
A CEO of a leading Western oil corporation argues that, currently, the best 
Russian oil and gas companies are still ten years behind their Western 
counterparts.163  Federal Law 129, signed by President Medvedev in July 2008, 
presumably designed to strengthen Russian nationalism, will only slow down the 
inevitable. The Russian government will likely come to realize that the resources 
it needs will remain firmly in the ground unless foreign technology, foreign money 
and foreign management are allowed in.  In the CEO’s view, it is inevitable that 
Western companies will be involved Russia’s Arctic development.164  If Russia 
agrees and once the bonds are in place, the potential for conflict in the region 
may be greatly reduced.      
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IV. JOINING RUSSIA AND THE WEST 
Allowing Western corporations to become active participants in the future 
of Russia’s hydrocarbon industry is by no means a one-sided arrangement.  
While these corporations gain economically as well as strategically, Russia gains 
not only access to difficult deposits but numerous other benefits as well.  Direct 
investment in Russia would bring new technology, management techniques, 
human capital and training for Russian workers.165  Considering the history of 
Russia’s poor management of its energy sector, a fresh perspective on 
contemporary extraction and distribution methods may ensure the industry 
remains viable well into the future.   
This chapter begins with an overview of Western hydrocarbon technology.  
As discussed in Chapter III, Russia’s hydrocarbon infrastructure is failing, its 
techniques used to extract oil and gas reservoirs have almost reached their 
productive limit and the state’s reliance on hydrocarbons necessitates it reinvest 
in the industry soon.  Western corporations possess the required technology, 
which Russia could use to maintain its industry.  Next, the chapter discusses 
some Russian barriers that may deter potential investors from considering 
involvement with Russian oil or gas corporations.  The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the unusual nature of the hydrocarbon industry.  Despite barriers and 
historical losses, corporations continue to risk investment in this sector.     
A. WHAT THE WEST HAS TO OFFER 
Russia is clearly not inept at hydrocarbon extraction.  One does not 
become the world’s leading natural gas and second oil exporter through 
incompetence.  However, Russia does lack the ability to make the most of their 
existing reserves.  In terms of oil production, the simple engineering techniques 
mentioned in Chapter III that increased the flow of oil around the turn of the 
                                            
165 Polachek, Seiglie and Xiang, "Globalization and International Conflict: Can FDI Increase 
Peace?" 281. 
 54
twentieth century but were not nearly enough to fully deplete what still remained 
below the surface.  Though their major producing fields may appear exhausted, 
the employment of modern techniques, known as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
or tertiary techniques, will further squeeze more crude from existing sites. 
 The oil initially extracted from a newly tapped well is harvested via 
primary recovery techniques.  Primary recovery involves the natural pressure of 
the oil field, augmented with additional equipment such as pumps, bringing the oil 
to the surface.  Due to equipment and natural limitations, primary recovery will 
yield only about 10 percent of the reservoir’s potential.166  Primary recovery was 
the relied-upon method of the Soviet-run industry; in the West this technology 
was eclipsed by secondary recovery methods in the 1950s.  The resurgence of 
Russia’s industry in 1999 was due in large part to the adoption of secondary 
recovery techniques that further depleted existing reservoirs.   
Secondary recovery techniques involve injecting water or gas into the 
reservoir to displace the oil and push it to a well where it is brought to the 
surface.  This technique results in the recovery of between 20 and 40 percent of 
the oil in place.167  The United States has successfully employed secondary 
recovery techniques since the 1950s and it continues to refine these methods 
while striving to achieve higher yields.168  In Russia, secondary recovery is 
underway and the United States has become involved through corporate 
acquisitions.    
Geolink, a U.K. company, has been assisting Russian oil companies for 
almost a decade in the recovery of oil via secondary extraction.  In 2004, oil 
systems group Sondex, another U.K. company, acquired Geolink and charged it 
with leading its Drilling Division.169  Three years later, U.S.-based General 
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Electric acquired Sondex thereby giving the United States a stake in Russia’s oil 
industry.170  Secondary recovery is only capable of extracting so much from the 
ground before even this technology is of no use.  The next step, with which 
Russia has little to no experience, is EOR techniques. 
EOR, or tertiary recovery techniques, involve a range of extraction 
possibilities and may recover over 60 percent of the available oil in a reservoir.  
Three categories of EOR have been employed with varying degrees of success 
in the United States.171 
 Thermal recovery, which involves the introduction of heat such 
as the injection of steam to lower the viscosity, or thin, the 
heavy viscous oil, and improve its ability to flow through the 
reservoir. Thermal techniques account for over 50 percent of 
U.S. EOR production, primarily in California. 
 
 Gas injection, which uses gases such as natural gas, nitrogen, 
or carbon dioxide that expand in a reservoir to push additional 
oil to a production wellbore, or other gases that dissolve in the 
oil to lower its viscosity and improves its flow rate. Gas injection 
accounts for nearly 50 percent of EOR production in the United 
States. 
 
 Chemical injection, which can involve the use of long-chained 
molecules called polymers to increase the effectiveness of 
waterfloods, or the use of detergent-like surfactants to help 
lower the surface tension that often prevents oil droplets from 
moving through a reservoir. Chemical techniques account for 
less than one percent of U.S. EOR production. 
 
According to industry analysts, “EOR has not been exploited in Russia in 
the way it has in many…other assets around the world so there is a huge 
opportunity here [for investment].”172  As stated above, Russia’s existing fields 
are near exhaustion and bringing new fields on line in what are considered hard-
to-reach locations will take time.  In the interim, adopting EOR methods will 
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provide a stopgap opportunity for the oil to keep flowing with little or no impact on 
national revenue.  Additionally, once the new fields begin production, knowledge 
of EOR techniques will ensure their longevity well beyond what was once 
considered the reservoir’s point of terminal decline.   
Russia’s oil companies have successfully collaborated with international 
companies in order to extract as much as possible from their wells.173  As 
secondary techniques run their course, it is only logical to move on to tertiary 
methods.  This next step may be one of several inroads which the West may 
establish FDI opportunities within Russia, thereby forging interdependence to 
thwart conflict escalation in the Arctic.  Extracting as much as possible from oil 
deposits is not the only area where Western technology may help overcome a 
Russian lack of expertise.  Another is offshore drilling, particularly in deep waters. 
Though Russia reportedly holds the world record for the deepest hole ever 
drilled, it has not been able to achieve the depths the West has in hydrocarbon 
production.174  Currently, Western companies hold a number of records for 
drilling the farthest.  On shore, the deepest natural gas well is located in 
Oklahoma and is run by Oklahoma-based GHK.  This well, known as GHK/Lone 
Star Bertha Rogers #1-27, measured 31,441 feet when molten sulfur inhibited 
further depth.175  ExxonMobil’s Z-11 well, located on Sakhalin Island in eastern 
Russia, became “the longest measured depth extended-reach drilling well in the 
world” after it achieved a total measured depth of 37,016 feet.176  Offshore, a 
Chevron well in the Gulf of Mexico measuring over 26,700 feet holds the world 
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record.177  Recently, Shell bested the “water depth record for an offshore oil 
drilling and production platform by over 50 percent” when its Perdido platform 
began extracting oil in over 8,000 feet of water off the coast of Texas.178        
Equipment developed in the West for Arctic hydrocarbon extraction 
represents the cutting edge of the industry.  For example, Transocean, a U.S.-
based company and the world’s largest offshore drilling company, announced 
that it is close to closing a deal with ExxonMobil for the construction of a new 
Arctic Class drilling rig as well as ice-class drill ships.179  Aker Drilling, a 
Norwegian offshore drilling contractor, recently constructed two semi-
submersible drilling rigs capable of ultra-deep water drilling and harsh 
environment operation.180  As a final example, Shell is planning to build a fleet of 
floating liquid natural gas plants.  These vessels would enable the tapping of gas 
fields far out to sea where previously it would have been too costly to construct 
the pipeline infrastructure to bring the gas onshore for processing.181  This is 
especially useful for Arctic operations where the unpredictable nature of the sea 
floor has blocked development of long-distance pipelines.  Russian industry 
executives have expressed interest in developments such as these, paving the 
way for possible avenues of investment.182 
British Petroleum (BP) is actively soliciting large-scale involvement in 
Russia’s Arctic and is promising to share technology in an effort to secure it.  In 
January 2010 at the Academy of National Economy under the Government of 
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Russia, then BP CEO Tony Hayward elaborated on BP’s experience in offshore 
Arctic regions such as the North Slope of Alaska, the Canadian Arctic and 
Northern Norway.  “Building on this expertise,” he said, “we would certainly 
welcome the opportunity to deploy our technology and skills to explore and 
produce Arctic resources in Russia as well.” 183 The technology he is referring to 
is BP’s Field of the Future program, which is present in over 80 percent of its top-
producing wells—700 in all.  The program “brings together existing and new 
technologies and integrat[es] them with real-time data management and revised 
business processes, to enable oil and gas field operations to be continuously 
monitored and operated from a distance, linked in real time to remote decision 
makers.”184  After initiating the program in 2005, BP has added almost 50,000 
barrels of oil per day to its yield.  The company’s outlook is to add 100,000 
barrels per day by 2017.185 
B. BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING COOPERATION 
The history of Russia’s gas industry is replete with examples of what not 
to do to successfully attract FDI.  Though it is difficult not to blame contemporary 
Russia for its present economic policies, the foundation of the Russian economic 
system was actually laid decades ago when hydrocarbons began to drive the 
economy and a condition known as the “resource curse” evolved within the state 
to be a hindrance to diversification and further prosperity.   
The resource curse, or “paradox of plenty,” are terms which refer to the 
apparent contradiction that states with a wealth of natural resources actually 
experience less economic growth than states without these or similar 
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resources.186  The curse stems from a reliance on exports of natural resources 
while at the same time neglecting other national industries.  Behind the decision 
not to diversify is the generation of large sums of revenue relatively easily and 
quickly while investment in additional industries is neglected.187  The job losses 
incurred as a result of neglecting other industries forces many skilled workers 
into the more stable hydrocarbon sector.188  This increased reliance on resource 
revenues makes industries, such as manufacturing, difficult to restore if the 
natural resource becomes depleted or if market price degrades.  Additionally, 
government revenue becomes so intertwined with the natural resource industry 
that the two become almost inseparable.  This is prevalent even in cases where 
the government does not own a significant portion of the sector as in the Russian 
government’s majority ownership in Gazprom.189   
1. Taxes 
Democratic governments in non-resource dependent economies generate 
revenue via citizen taxation.  In return, citizens insist government be efficient and 
responsive to their needs.  An administration which fails in this bargain will soon 
be replaced by one promising to be more responsive.  Thus, a relationship 
between leadership and citizenry is established. In democracies with resource-
dominant economies there is less of a requirement to depend on the citizens for 
revenue because the government has what amounts to a guaranteed source of 
income from the natural resource market.190  In Russia, this is the case with the 
gas and oil industries.  Gazprom’s tax payments alone account for over 25 
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percent of the nation’s federal tax revenues.191  Taxation in the oil industry has 
not only led to the neglect of infrastructure to the point where production suffers, 
but it has harmed the potential for FDI as well: 
Desperate to make as much money as it can [from hydrocarbons] 
…  the government levies a punitively high export duty, taking more 
than half the proceeds of any barrel that fetches a market price of 
more than $25.  When all the other changes are taken into 
account—a variety of corporate, payroll and production taxes—then 
industry insiders complain that the state is taking as much as 92 
percent of profits made by international ventures such as TNK-BP.  
So the output from TNK-BP’s fields in Russia…accounts for one-
fifth of BP’s overall global production, but only one-tenth of its 
profits, and its officials have long argued that the oil industry is 
confronted by rising costs that will make many investments in 
Russia quite unprofitable unless the tax regime is drastically 
changed.192 
 One facet of the tax regime causing one of the largest barriers to 
investment is found in Russia’s classification of its hydrocarbon assets.  
“Offshore oil and gas are clearly defined as strategic natural resource assets 
and, consequently, fall under the evolving legislation and policies on strategic 
resources that explicitly limit such non-Russian involvement.”193  Accordingly, 
foreign private investors are required to obtain government approval before 
acquiring 51 percent or more of a strategic company.  Additionally, offshore 
hydrocarbon fields are referred to as items of “federal significance” and thus any 
foreign entity wishing to acquire more than a 10 percent share must also receive 
government permission.194  Even foreign companies that have managed to gain 
approval have experienced setbacks in realizing economic gain as the Russian 
government all but forced corporations into unfavorable contract terms.  A recent 
example of the government influencing corporate investors’ profits occurred 
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when investors sought inclusion in a very large natural gas reserve in 
southeastern Russia known as Sakhalin Island. 
2. Shell’s Experience With Sakhalin-2 
The Sakhalin-2 project, drawing upon two generous fields, was to become 
the world’s largest liquid natural gas plant.  On 4 December 1994, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin signed a law outlining a production-sharing agreement 
between Russia and Marathon for the Sakhalin-2 project with Marathon 
conducting most of research and development while Russia reaped the rewards.  
By February 2000, the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company had grown to 
include Marathon, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Shell, with Shell having a 62.5 percent 
controlling stake in the project.195   In 2003, Russia’s Natural Resources Ministry 
granted permission to begin construction of the liquid natural gas plant while at 
the same time separate ecological organizations began accusing Sakhalin 
Energy of harming the population of gray whales due to the facility’s equipment 
being too close to breeding grounds.196  Despite the corporation’s $5 million 
investment in ensuring the project was well clear of all areas potentially affecting 
the whales, Sakhalin Energy rerouted its pipelines to further comply with the 
ecological organization’s request.  In 2005, when everything appeared to be 
proceeding smoothly, Shell signed a deal with Gazprom granting the latter a 25 
percent stake in the consortium in exchange for a 50 percent stake in one of 
Gazprom’s western Siberian fields.197  However, in August 2006, the project 
began to sour for Shell and the other foreign investors.   
The Russian Natural Resources Ministry declared the Sakhalin-2 project 
an environmental hazard as the ministry’s experts determined the project had 
become a high risk for mudslides which would reportedly lead to water pollution, 
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equipment damage and fatalities.198  Though Sakhalin Energy insisted it had 
“already taken into consideration construction solutions to prevent such damage 
from occurring,” it was nonetheless ordered to cease work on the onshore 
pipelines and rework the design.199  Weeks later, the Ministry revoked the 2003 
approval for the project after it was over 80 percent complete.200   Further, 
although denying any association with the government, a Russian environmental 
watchdog group known as Rosprirodnadzor threatened to bring “criminal cases 
for every tree destroyed or damaged river.  If criminal cases are opened for 
everything, the company will read the criminal code, come to its senses and stop 
the barbarian activity.”201  The disassociation with the government ended when 
the Natural Resources Minister Yuri Trutnev asked Rosprirodnadzor to provide 
details of Sakhalin Energy’s environmental infractions.   By 21 December 2006, 
Shell yielded to Russian pressure.  Shell reduced its controlling stake in the 
project to just over 27 percent with Gazprom assuming a 51 percent stake.  With 
Gazprom in charge, the environmental concerns all but vanished within days of 
Shell’s acquiescence, even though few additional measures were taken at the 
construction site to ease Rosprirodnadzor’s concerns.202  According to President 
Putin, all ecological issues were considered resolved.  “I’m pleased that our 
environmental services and the investors have agreed on the way of resolving 
ecological problems,” he briefed the nation via a televised speech.203   
Clearly, this type of behavior toward foreign investment makes potential 
investors skittish of getting involved in any Russian-sponsored projects and 
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pushing investors away in no way helps Russia solve its problem of gaining 
access to Arctic reserves or maintaining its current reserves.  Technologically 
advanced development pursued under an autarkic policy will not succeed.  
Russia is now finding the truth in this in its hydrocarbon industry as it did in 
military and technological development during the Cold War.  As Russian 
economist Grigorii Khanin argued, “International integration is the chief strength 
of the Western Economy.”204   
3. BP’s Experience With Kovykta  
Discovered in 1987 and located in East Siberia’s Irkutsk Oblast, the 
Kovykta field is estimated to contain over 2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas 
and 83 million tons of gas condensate.205  RUSIA Petroleum holds the license for 
developing Kovykta and TNK-BP holds a 63 percent stake in RUSIA.206  TNK-BP 
itself is a joint venture composed of Russian TNK (formerly Tyumen Neftegaz 
Company) and British Petroleum; with each member having an equal 50 percent 
stake in the partnership.  TNK-BP is unique as it is the only large energy 
company in Russia that it is not majority-controlled by Russians and does not 
have any state shareholders.207  Under an agreement reached in 1997 between 
TNK-BP and the Russian government, Kovykta was required to produce 9 bcm of 
gas per year by 2006.  Since then, TNK-BP has invested over $1 billion in the 
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project.208 The investors’ long-term goal was to become a key exporter of gas to 
China while also meeting a Russian requirement to supply gas to Irkutsk.209   
Trouble began in 2007 when Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources 
accused TNK-BP of not meeting their license agreement of 9 bcm as they were 
only producing approximately 34 million cubic meters.  President Putin, at the G8 
summit in Germany, outwardly attacked TNK-BP for their poor yield:  
I would like to stress that the field has reserves of three trillion cubic 
meters [sic]. To understand its importance for our country it is equal 
to almost all the reserves of Canada. But if the members of the 
consortium are doing nothing to meet license obligations, how 
much longer do we have to tolerate this?210 
 Producing the 9 bcm, however, would not have been justifiable since TNK-
BP was unable to move the gas to a large population of buyers.  First, the 
demand in Irkutsk is very low due to the Russian government not creating the 
infrastructure to carry the gas to the local population.  There is also speculation 
that even if the infrastructure had been developed, demand would still have been 
very low and Gazprom would have siphoned off the excess for export as its own 
product.211  Second, in 2007, Gazprom became the monopoly owner of all export 
gas and as such they refused TNK-BP access to the pipeline, preventing any 
possibility of export to China.  In short, the Russian state inhibited any investor 
profit and the $700 million invested in the project was becoming a loss.  
 Under pressure from the Russian Mineral Resources Oversight Service, 
which threatened to revoke RUSIA’s license to develop Kovykta, in 2007 TNK-BP 
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offered to sell its share of the project to Gazprom for $700 million to $900 million 
but the agreement never closed.  Since then the Russian government constantly 
harassed TNK-BP for its low production and violation of the licensing agreement.   
In addition, Yuri Trutnev, the Russian Natural Resources Minister, declared that if 
the state were to inherit the Kovykta project because of TNK-BP not fulfilling their 
obligations, TNK-BP would not be compensated for the capital invested.212   
In June 2010, RUSIA filed for bankruptcy after TNK-BP recalled the 
credits it had over time granted to the license holder all the while knowing RUSIA 
would not be able to repay the loans.  As RUSIA’s creditor, the bankruptcy was 
designed to allow TNK-BP to auction off RUSIA’s property in the hopes TNK-BP 
could earn back some of its original investments in the Kovykta project.  Under 
Russian legislation on mineral resources, if a license-holding company becomes 
bankrupt, the license subsequently passes to the new buyer.  However, since 
Kovykta had been categorized as a strategic asset, the license could not be 
transferred to a foreign company.213  In sum, after TNK-BP conducted all of the 
initial preparation, in the end Russia will be the one that reaps all of the benefits 
to this investment.  
C. THE NATURE OF HYDROCARBONS 
The above examples illustrate the difficulties and frustrations involved in 
attempting to gain a foothold in the Russian hydrocarbon industry.  Such events 
have made major investors skittish and outright angry.  Rex Tillerson, CEO of 
ExxonMobil, told an audience gathered at the St. Petersburg International 
Economic Forum, “There is no confidence in the rule of law in Russia today.”214  
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President Medvedev has also acknowledged the troubling investment climate in 
Russia and its impact on FDI.  In his speech to The Brookings Institution in April 
2010, Medvedev said: 
There are things we [Russia] can do in order to improve the climate 
and its elements, some economic regimes that could be used, 
including the situation with the legal system.  We can improve the 
functioning of our accords, we could combat corruption.  We see 
these problems…215 
Yet investors continue to court the Russian government for access to the 
state’s vast deposits. The reason, according to Emmerson, is that foreign oil 
companies, “driven by the need to maintain their reserves…have little choice.”216 
Though Russia’s actions toward potential investors has been callous, 
Brooks argues that the unique nature of “highly valuable natural resources—that 
is, resources of which the reserves are scarce and geographically concentrated 
[such as petroleum]” attract investors regardless of the risks.217  Perhaps Russia 
will always have a ready supply of investors that it can mistreat due to the nature 
of the resources the state was endowed with.  However, unlike states such as 
Nigeria, which only grant access to their resources in exchange for money, 
Russia has a stake in harvesting them for its own use.218  As Russia’s current 
stock of hydrocarbons depletes, it may be rapidly losing the ability to negotiate 
contracts unfavorable to outside corporations.  For this reason, it may be willing 
to reduce the barriers it currently presents toward potential investment and if it 
does, the situation in the Arctic may evolve into a less tense atmosphere.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
There is a clear and rational foundation for creating a capitalist peace in 
the Arctic between Russia and the West.  The hydrocarbon industries in both 
regions are in a state of decline due to their existing wells being unable to 
maintain historic levels of production.  On one side, Russia is endowed with 
newly discovered, vast Arctic reserves but lacks the technology to successfully 
cultivate them.  On the other, the West lacks the reserves but does possess the 
technology required to reach fields located in one of the harshest environments 
in the world.  Considering that corporate entities in both regions are interested in 
developing Russia’s reserves, the possibility exists that the two sides may joined 
into a mutually beneficial relationship involving high levels of FDI.  
The melting of the Arctic ice and the resultant accessibility of resources 
and waterways has brought a focus on the region never before experienced.  Not 
only are states petitioning the United Nations for their stake in these resources, 
they are also taking measures to ensure that no other actor can take by force 
what they perceive as their own.  Russia’s recent actions have influenced the 
Arctic policies of the other Arctic states.  These policies, or national security 
directives, appear to be entrenched in the realist theory of international relations.  
The realist approach of meeting perceived aggression with an increase in military 
power designed to offset this aggression mirrors certain aspects of the proposals 
outlined by Canada, Norway and the United States.  As this thesis has proposed, 
however, proposed an alternate means of easing tensions in the region is to 
establish a capitalist peace. 
The capitalist peace theory holds that a significant level of FDI between 
two countries minimizes the potential for military conflict thereby leading to more 
peaceful relations.  The most beneficial scenario for the United States would be if 
Russia sought U.S. experience, as FDI between dyads has the most potential to 
diffuse security dilemmas.  The United States has proven itself capable of 
providing the expertise that Russia lacks.  The hydrocarbon industry in the United 
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States has a long history of extracting Arctic oil and natural gas and remains at 
the forefront of emerging technologies in this area.  In addition, U.S. 
corporations, such as ExxonMobil, have already successfully operated in the 
Russian Arctic and have set international drilling records while doing so.  
However, foreign direct investment in Russia is not the only capitalist method for 
easing U.S.-Russia tensions.   
Research shows how states petitioning for FDI tend to be more pacific.  
Additionally, not only are the recipients more pacific, but so are the petitioners for 
FDI.  This is because conflict deters potential investors from becoming involved 
in prospective business partnerships.  According to Polachek et al., the host 
government, in this case Russia “may be induced to adopt cooperative policies in 
order to demonstrate a friendly image towards FDI in order to attract further 
investments from other countries.”219  For this reason, even if Russia chose to 
exclude U.S. involvement it might still be conciliatory towards the United States in 
order to court others. 
A. RUSSIA’S PAST BEHAVIOR AND CURRENT BARRIERS TO FDI 
Although BP and Shell experienced negative outcomes with their 
investments in Russia, the nation’s history is replete with foreign corporations 
successfully becoming involved in its industry.  For example, according to 
Russian historian, Richard Pipes: 
The great surge of Russian industrial production in the 1890s, 
which attained a pace unmatched either before or since, was not so 
much the outgrowth of Russia’s own, internal economic 
development, as the result of the transplantation of western money, 
technology and above all, management.220 
Additionally, the Soviet Union once welcomed Western corporations, such 
as Pepsi Cola and Ford Motor Company, to invest and establish manufacturing 
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sites within their borders.221  Contemporary Russia also possesses several 
inroads for relatively small-scale FDI, such as chemical manufacturing, 
biotechnology, white goods (i.e., refrigerators, washing machines, etc.) and 
architectural glass.222  However, even with Russia’s history with FDI, the state 
has established barriers to such investment in what it considers strategic sectors 
of the state economy.  These barriers have been established in industries 
precisely where Russia would seem to benefit the most from foreign expertise.  A 
law passed by the State Duma and endorsed by the Federation Council in April 
2008 named a long list of strategic industries such as metals, shipbuilding, 
aircraft manufacturing and, most notably as it relates to this thesis, hydrocarbons 
as those of strategic importance.223 
Currently, if any foreign company wishes to pursue investment in one of 
these strategic sectors it must first petition the Russian government for 
permission.  Assuming permission is granted, if the foreign company is a global 
organization, it will never be allowed to assume control over the project.  The law 
defines foreign control of a project “engaged in geological surveying of subsoil 
and/or exploration and production of mineral resources” as having just 10 percent 
of the total shares.224  As many of the hydrocarbon corporations interested in 
investing in Russia are globalized (such as BP, Shell and ExxonMobil), the law 
ensures that the Russian state will maintain control of all FDI initiatives within the 
oil and natural gas sector.    
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Russia’s law appears to run counter to the goal then President Putin 
declared upon taking power in 2001: to attain in 15 years the same living 
standard as Portugal and Spain.225  Considered a developing country following 
its separation from communism, Russia would seem to want to attract FDI to 
boost its economy.226  Developing a nation’s economy via FDI is normally 
characterized by liberalizing national policies toward investment and “relaxing 
rules regarding market entry and foreign ownership [and] improving the 
standards of treatment accorded to foreign firms.”227  The new law’s departure 
from this philosophy underscores Russia’s attitude toward its resources and has 
been met with mixed reviews from Western analysts. 
Some Western economic analysts champion the new legislation, claiming 
it makes the process of investing more transparent compared to previous 
procedures, thereby avoiding another Kovykta or Sakhalin fiasco, while others 
focus on the law’s difficulties.  President of the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Russia, Andrew Somers, notes, “We’re not too concerned [about the new 
law]…investors will have a greater degree of certainty about the level of foreign 
investment the Kremlin will tolerate in these industries.”228  Others, however, see 
the new requirements as more of a deterrent.  The long, cumbersome approval 
process is one such area.  Another deterrent is the level of detail investors are 
required to divulge before their proposal is considered.229    
The April 2008 law indicates that Russia has done little to improve the 
investment climate in its hydrocarbon sector in recent years.  Considering the 
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Russian economy’s overwhelming dependence on oil and natural gas, it is 
important for Russia to make a determination on whether it will relax the barriers 
to FDI within this industry.  Were Russia to attempt to revive the industry on its 
own, this would require more time and money than the state can afford 
considering the depleted condition of its existing fields.  Therefore, it is incumbent 
upon Russia to solicit FDI in order to maintain its foothold in the oil and natural 
gas market.  Yet the barriers remain.  Somewhat surprisingly, Western 
companies have shown little indication of being deterred by the recent legislation.      
B. WHY THE WEST REMAINS INTERESTED 
All of the major Western oil companies are experiencing a decline in 
production due to dwindling reserves.230  ExxonMobil, for example, experienced 
a 9.2 percent decline in its African wells, a source representing more than one-
fourth of the company’s oil production, and a 10 percent decline in its U.S. 
wells.231  ConocoPhillips also recorded a loss in production when its fields, 
located chiefly in the United States and Europe, yielded a 4 percent decline.232   
The decline stems primarily from maturing fields, though governments in 
oil-rich regions have also renegotiated contracts allocating fewer barrels to 
Western companies in order to increase profits for national enterprises.233  
According to an analyst at Barclays Capital, “It has become really, really difficult 
to grow production.  International companies have a portfolio of assets in areas 
of significant decline and no frontier discoveries to make up for that.”234   
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A struggling Western industry represents a paradigm shift in hydrocarbon 
production because for decades over 50 percent of the world’s oil and natural 
gas market was dominated by just seven companies—ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, 
Chevron, ConcoPhillips, Total and Eni.  These companies now produce only 13 
percent of the world’s oil and natural gas.235  Currently, the largest companies 
are all national corporations such as Gazprom and Rosneft, which Oil and Gas 
Journal rank as 11 and 12 respectively.236  Accompanying the shift in company 
ownership, the underlying purpose of the industry has also shifted.  State-
controlled companies are no longer focused on shareholder profits per se; rather 
they operate under a mandate to secure additional resources for their home 
countries.  Petrochina, for example, outbid Western companies when Libya sold 
offshore-drilling licenses in the Mediterranean Sea.  In effect, Petrochina was 
able to forgo oil profits, which would be compensated for with other state 
industries, in order to gain access to the oil, something that would is impossible 
for profit-oriented corporations.237   
To compensate for their inability to gain access to foreign reserves, 
Western companies have attempted to diversify but with limited success.  Shell 
and BP, for example have invested in renewable fuels while others have eyed 
heavy oil and tar sands.238  In order to survive, however, the leading Western oil 
and natural gas corporations, like Russia’s nationalized companies, must tap into 
new reservoirs and the Arctic may represent the best option for this to occur.   
C. RUSSIA’S ARCTIC AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE 
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that there may be over 90 
billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels 
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of natural gas liquids to be found in the Arctic.239 Of proven reserves, the Arctic 
possesses 61 large oil and natural gas fields, with 43 of them being located in 
Russia.240  A 2004 BP estimate told of 69.1 billion barrels of oil, 6 percent of the 
world’s oil, in Russian territory.241  That same year, a Dallas-based energy 
auditor, who names Gazprom as a client, estimated Russia’s recoverable 
reserves to be between 150 billion and 200 billion barrels of oil.242  In short, 
Russia is well endowed with natural resources.   
Yet Russian technology is incapable of extracting the oil and natural gas 
from its newly uncovered Arctic territory.  Conversely, Western corporations are 
in need of new oil reserves and possess the technology to begin extraction 
almost immediately.  The capitalist peace is based on the establishment of 
economic relationships, which serve to override the potential for increases in 
hostilities.  The hydrocarbon industry may be where these relationships are 
forged.  Achieving a capitalist peace is by no means a foregone conclusion.  
Political obstacles, such as the Russian law mentioned above, as well as 
counterarguments posed by realist critics will inhibit the transition from the 
region’s tense present state to one more pacific.243   
Facilitating the capitalist peace will require Russian leaders to reevaluate 
the costs and benefits of its barriers to FDI in the hydrocarbon industry.  
Considering its maturing wells and its dependence on oil and gas revenue as 
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well as its use of gas for strategic leverage, Russia should comprehend the folly 
of fostering a business climate unattractive to investors.  Unfortunately, Russia’s 
recent behavior has given little indication that it will soon reevaluate its policies.  
Its 2008 law as well as the examples set in Kovykta and Sakhalin may be 
indications that Russia would rather keep its resources in the ground rather than 
risk losing them in the competitive atmosphere that is capitalism.   
For its part, the United States should maintain its “reset” policy designed 
to create more peaceful American-Russian relations.  Though the Obama 
Administration still adheres to NSPD-66, it has shown a willingness to depart 
from realist principles and adopt more conciliatory policies.244  Continuing to do 
so may make Russia more receptive toward U.S. industry becoming involved in 
its strategic resources.        
There are at least two possibilities for how the situation in the Arctic will 
evolve.  One resembles a realist solution with large increases in military 
capabilities and states posturing for regional dominance.  This solution involves 
enormous expenditures and a future characterized by tension and possibly 
violence.  The other solution appears to be more universally beneficial.  With 
Western oil and natural gas corporations joined with those of Russia, the 
expectation is that such high levels of FDI would bring a kind of peace to the 
region.  It is important to note that the prospect of a capitalist peace does not 
equate to a lack of rivalry.  The resultant atmosphere will involve fierce 
competition over markets as both sides vie for greater profits and larger shares of 
resources.  However, an atmosphere characterized by competition is much 
preferred over the realist vision of an atmosphere characterized by military 
conflict.   
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